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Abstract of the dissertation 
A Neural Network for Uncertainty Anticipation and Information Seeking 
by 
J. Kael White 
Doctor of Philosophy in Biology and Biomedical Sciences 
Neurosciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019 
Assistant Professor Ilya E. Monosov, Chair 
 
In a world flooded with ‘click bait’, ‘alternative facts’, and ‘fake news’ one’s ability to 
seek out, discern, and value information is of utmost importance. Although contemporary 
phenomena, these cultural ills take advantage of an evolutionarily-preserved drive for humans 
and nonhuman animals to monitor for and pursue opportunities to gain information. Indeed, in a 
natural environment where rewards are scarce and can be risky, animals often seek sensory cues 
as a source of information about future outcomes. Interestingly, humans and nonhuman animals 
will seek sensory information that provides advance information that predicts an outcome even 
when this information does not influence the event outcome or may even come at a cost to the 
eventual reward. This willingness to ‘pay’ for information, despite being unable to impact task 
outcome, indicates that the information itself has intrinsic value to subjects. But how and where 
in the brain are opportunities to learn new information about uncertain events signaled? How 
does the brain guide behavior towards pursuing this information? Elucidating these mechanisms 
would expand our understanding of how information seeking interacts with primary reward 
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seeking in naturalistic environments and could further inform theories of attention, learning, and 
economic decision-making. 
Here, I demonstrate that connected regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
striatum, and pallidum contain neurons whose activity is selectively modulated by the presence 
and levels of outcome uncertainty. I describe the response of these neurons, many of which 
anticipate the resolution of uncertainty about an outcome— including when it is resolved through 
the animal seeking advance information. Finally, I demonstrate that the neural activity within 
areas of basal ganglia in this ‘uncertainty circuit’ causally contributes to information-seeking 
behaviors observed in nonhuman primates. This work demonstrates that connected regions of the 
brain previously associated with responses to primary rewards and motivation also contain a 
mechanism for anticipating uncertainty resolution and directing behaviors towards pursuing 











Chapter 1: Introduction to the dissertation 
To begin this chapter, I provide an overview of information-seeking behaviors in human 
and nonhuman animals and how these behaviors might be useful in an uncertain world. 
Thereafter, I describe the role of the striatum in contributing to motivated and reward-related 
behaviors and as an integrator of cortical and midbrain signals. I then provide an overview of the 
organization of cortico-basal ganglia loops and the role of these networks in motivating animal 
behavior. Finally, I describe the connectivity and functions of connected areas of ACC and basal 
ganglia; I detail their roles signaling reward uncertainty and motivating reward-related behaviors 
and explain why this network is a good candidate for the signaling of upcoming uncertainty 
resolution and information availability. In sum, I will present an argument that these brain 
regions- already heavily implicated in motivating behavior towards primary reward- are ideal 
candidate regions for the investigation of the mechanisms by which the brain anticipates 
uncertainty resolution and drives behavior towards pursuing information about upcoming 
rewards.  
1.1 Animals exist in an uncertain world and are motivated to reduce uncertainty through 
seeking information 
 We live in an uncertain world in which outcomes are variable, choices are risky, and the 
future is not often predicted with precision. Therefore, humans and other animals accurately 
estimating and reducing uncertainty can increase success in maximizing rewarding outcomes. 
Uncertainty can arise from a number of sources.1 For example, someone could be uncertain 
about the past because of imperfections in memory, or uncertain about the current state of the 
world because of noisy or limited senses, such as imperfections in vision. This thesis will focus 
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primarily on outcome uncertainty, which arises when an animal is unsure about which events- or 
outcomes- will occur in the future. A common source of outcome uncertainty- and one which 
will be investigated extensively within this thesis- is that of economic risk, where the possible 
outcomes, timing, and probabilities of an outcome in a given situation are understood by the 
subject, but where the outcome itself remains unknown until the animal experiences the outcome 
event.2,3  
For example, although one may understand the (dismally low) odds of winning in a 
lottery system such as the Powerball, the outcome of a ticket remains uncertain until when the 
numbers for the winner are drawn. Contrast this with an envelope that contains a dollar amount 
equal to the average yield of the lottery ticket (e.g.: $2.00). Where both objects share an expected 
value, the ticket has a degree of uncertainty (is risky) where the envelope has none (is safe). 
Humans and nonhuman animals often have strong preferences for choosing between certain and 
uncertain outcomes. For example, a gambling person might tend to choose the lottery ticket (risk 
seeking) while a more conservative person might tend to choose the envelope (risk averse). 
How uncertainty guides behavior in humans and nonhuman animals is an interesting and 
ongoing topic of research in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and economics. For 
example, uncertainty about an outcome can enhance learning2–6, promote risk-seeking3,7, and 
influence choice behavior1,2,4,8 and emotional state.1,9 Consistent with these observations of 
uncertainty’s diverse influence on behavior, subsequent studies demonstrated that many brain 
regions are modulated by uncertainty.  For example, human fMRI studies indicated that multiple 
regions of the brain, including the striatum10,11 and many areas of the neocortex12–14, are 
modulated by outcome uncertainty. Single-unit recordings indicated that the activity of 
individual neurons across the brain is modulated by reward uncertainty15–22. Although these 
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studies offer insight into how activity in different brain regions is modulated by uncertainty, the 
field has yet to determine the neural mechanisms by which the brain anticipates uncertain 
outcomes, values uncertain rewards, and drives behaviors towards reducing uncertainty about the 
future.  
How is it that uncertainty about the future can be reduced? By obtaining information 
about an outcome in advance, animals can resolve uncertainty about an outcome prior to it 
occurring. Take, as an example, the risk-seeking gambler from above: imagine that she pulls the 
lever on a slot machine in which the symbols spin for 10 seconds before their identities are 
revealed and the outcome (i.e.: a win or a loss) occurs. In this scenario she would be in a state of 
uncertainty about the outcome until the symbols stop spinning and it occurs. Alternatively, 
imagine if the machine contained a button that, when pressed, would reveal the identity of the 
symbols immediately but the outcome would only occur 10 seconds after the lever was pulled. In 
this second situation uncertainty was resolved at an earlier timepoint through the delivery of 
advance information about the outcome. Importantly, the timing and the outcome of the gamble 
is constant across these scenarios; the only difference between them is that uncertainty was 
resolved in the latter at an earlier timepoint. 
 Pioneering behavioral experiments demonstrated that animals often prefer uncertain 
outcomes to be resolved at an early timepoint and will preferentially exhibit ‘observing 
responses’ which provide information about upcoming reinforcing outcomes.23 This research has 
been replicated in subjects ranging from pigeons, to rats, to nonhuman primates23–28 and suggests 
that animals across a wide range of species readily learn these observing behaviors. Indeed, in 
the field of economics, for example, similar preferences for this early information in human 
subjects were reported across a number of studies.29–31 That is, when given the option to reveal 
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the outcome of an uncertain situation, humans will choose to do so at the earliest possible 
moment, even when this information cannot be used to impact the outcome or give the subject 
any advantage in the task. Interestingly, this desire is strong enough that both humans31 and 
nonhuman primates28 will exchange a portion of their upcoming reward in order to obtain this 
advance information about task outcome.  
Despite the prevalence of these observing and information-seeking behaviors, the neural 
mechanisms that drive and maintain them remain unclear. One proposal is that these behaviors 
are supported by neural circuits that overlap with those that underlie conventional reward-
seeking behaviors.26 It is suggested that midbrain dopamine neurons, for example, are important 
for reward learning and motivated behavior.32–36 The activity of many of these neurons transmits 
a reward prediction error (RPE).35,37 An RPE is a signal of the difference between the expected 
value of an outcome and the delivered value of an outcome. RPE signals within the brain could 
contribute to computing the value of rewarding actions and reinforce actions that maximize 
primary rewards over a period of time.32,33 Such a signal could contribute substantially to 
learning, memory, and motivated behaviors.34  Although RPE-based reinforcement learning has 
the power to explain much of what motivates animals to pursue primary rewards37–39, behaviors 
that show preference for this advance information would not be predicted by this model. 
Consider a secondary cue that gives information about a coin toss: a 50/50 chance of either a 
positive or negative outcome. Because the chances of this cue providing a positive RPE is the 
same as it providing a negative RPE, the secondary cue-seeking behavior would not be 
reinforced as the overall RPE would be neutral. Although multiple models have been 
proposed27,40–42 to explain this gap in our understanding, the exact mechanisms that support these 
behaviors remain unclear. 
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 A recent study26 looking at midbrain dopamine neurons reported a similar response to 
advance information. Much like RPEs with primary rewards, ‘information prediction errors’ 
(IPEs) were higher when there was more information about outcome than expected and lower 
when there was less information about outcome than expected. Other information-related 
patterns of response are also observed in other motivational brain areas, including one of the 
major inputs to midbrain dopamine neurons, the lateral habenula27 as well as areas of 
neocortex.28 Taken together with the behavioral preferences for information seen in both human 
and nonhuman animals, these findings support the idea that the brain might use overlapping 
neural systems to motivate the pursuit of primary rewards and the pursuit of information about 
upcoming rewards.  
Despite the importance of uncertainty resolution and information seeking to everyday life, 
the mechanisms that underlie these behaviors remains largely unknown. Where and how does the 
brain represent levels of uncertainty and availability of information? Further, which brain area or 
areas are capable of motivating animals to reduce uncertainty and seek information? 
1.2 The striatum has a demonstrated role in reward-evaluation, reward-seeking, and other 
motivated behaviors 
The striatum is the primary input structure of a set of subcortical structures known as the 
basal ganglia and has long been considered an integrator43–47 of glutamatergic signals from 
cortex48–50 and dopaminergic signals from the midbrain.51–54 Of particular interest to this 
integration are medium spiny neurons (MSNs), which make up the vast majority of neurons 
found in the striatum and are a major target of midbrain dopamine neurons. The excitatory 
response of the MSNs to cortical input is modulated by  dopamine as well as by the activity of 
largely inhibitory populations of local interneurons.55–57 Within the striatum, synapses from 
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cortical inputs are preferentially contacted by projections from midbrain dopamine neurons 
relative to those that originate from thalamus.55 These synaptic interactions are thought to 
underlie the roles of the striatum in supporting motivated, reward-related behaviors. 
A large and growing body of literature has identified reward-related signals in the 
striatum and broadly implicates its role in motivational and reward-related behaviors. For 
example, early human PET experiments found increased levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine 
in subjects both with the stimulation of primary food reward58 as well as rewarding epochs in a 
video game.59 Later fMRI experiments verified that the striatum responds while subjects learned 
and anticipated rewarding outcomes60–64 and that these responses could be influenced by varying 
the properties of these rewards, such as reward magnitude and timing.62,65–67 Similarly, 
physiological recordings within the dorsal regions of this structure have demonstrated that 
activity in this region represents the anticipation68,69 and delivery70,71 of primary reward, action-
dependent rewards72–75, and that it contains signals capable of directing an animal’s gaze towards 
rewarding outcomes.76–79 In line with these findings, studies that manipulated striatal activity 
found that doing so changes reward-driven behaviors in a number of ways. Lesions and 
inactivations of the striatum yielded strong effects, including changes in reward-choice 
behaviors80,81, and learning and habituation.82–84  Injection of muscimol, a GABAA agonist into 
striatum resulted in decreases in reward-learning85, choice86, and feeding behaviors80,81 and 
resulted in decreased performance in reward-related tasks, as well as slower response times to 
preferred rewards.80,85 Additionally, pharmacologically manipulating activity in separate regions 
of striatum resulted in different effects during interactions with rewards.87 In sum, these studies 
suggest that neuronal activity within the striatum is not only modulated by the presence and 
properties of reward, but that it also causally influences reward-driven action. 
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1.3 Cortico-basal ganglia networks contribute to and refine motivated behaviors  
Projections from the frontal cortex to the striatum are organized and are thought to often 
follow stereotyped functional and topographical pathways.45,50,88,89 An early anatomical study 
suggested90 that these pathways compose closed “loops” from specific regions of cortex, to basal 
ganglia, to thalamus, and back to cortex. In this way, partially overlapping inputs from the cortex 
are integrated and refined along the progression of the circuit and “funneled” back into a single 
area of cortex. Activity across these circuits is segregated to specific areas with sensory, motor, 
or associative functions.90 These neural circuits  provide the framework for cortico-striatal 
interactions that could contribute widely to reward seeking and motivated behaviors.  
 Additionally, these closed loops explain observed similarities in function between 
anatomically-connected areas of cortex and striatum. For example, there are established 
projections91–94 from motor, pre-motor, and somatosensory cortex to caudal dorsolateral striatum. 
Activity in this region of striatum contributes to sensorimotor behaviors, such as learned and 
innate sequential actions95–99, motor learning and planning72,100–104, and habit formation.72,105–107 
Similarly, projections from orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex broadly innervate areas of 
rostromedial dorsal striatum as well as ventral striatum.46,89,92,108 These areas of striatum 
contribute to goal-directed behaviors109–111 and reward learning112–115 and, further, dysregulation 
of these areas and their connections have been implicated in a number of mental illnesses.116–121 
Projections from additional areas of prefrontal cortex, such as the dorsolateral and medial 
prefrontal cortex- including areas of ACC- project broadly to rostrodorsal striatum.48,122–124 This 
innervation could provide signals that influence more cognitive processes, such as working 
memory125–130 and behavioral flexibility.131–134 Taken together, the connections that compose the 
broad networks of cortico-striatal projections create a rough topographical organization between 
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cortex and the striatum that contributes broadly to a wide-ranging repertoire of motivated 
behaviors. 
Although projections from cortex to striatum have often been considered parallel and 
segregated along this topographical map, there is growing evidence to suggest that the loops that 
they form are more overlapped than previously understood.46,50,135,136 The processes by which 
information is exchanged across these circuits is believed to be at least partially dependent on 
cross-over connections that exist within and downstream of the basal ganglia.136–139 These 
integrating nodes across cortico-basal ganglia loops that convey different properties of a situation 
could underlie evaluation of more complex object-outcome relationships than entirely segregated 
networks. In line with this concept, both associative and cognitive signals63,101,107,109,114,140,141 
have been reported broadly throughout areas of the striatum that were believed at one point to be 
largely dedicated to motor functions. Overall, it is currently understood that networks that 
encompass regions of cortex and basal ganglia contribute broadly to motivated behaviors, 
particularly to those which are directed at rewarding outcomes.  
1.4 Signals related to uncertain rewards are present in anatomically-connected regions of 
cortex and basal ganglia that motivate behavior towards primary rewards 
In order for the brain to promote information-seeking behaviors, neural mechanisms 
which monitor uncertainty should be tightly linked to those which underlie motivational 
processes. The striatum plays a key role in reward-seeking and motivational behaviors and as 
such might be an ideal candidate to fulfill this role. But where in the striatum might we expect to 
find uncertainty-related activity? Drawing inspiration from the cortico-basal ganglia loops 
discussed previously, it would likely be a region of striatum that share connections with areas of 
cortex and other areas of basal ganglia which have strong responses to uncertainty. In this way, 
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this region of striatum could process uncertainty signals from cortex and project them further 
into the basal ganglia to drive behavior. 
 Recently, single-unit recordings of neurons in ACC determined that largely separate 
populations of neurons respond to appetitive and aversive uncertain outcomes.15 The mostly 
excitatory activity of different populations of these neurons signaled information about the 
uncertainty of  juice rewards and air-puff punishments. These findings compliment the 
demonstrated role of ACC in the control of cognitive functions and motivated behaviors aimed at 
both optimizing rewards142–146 and avoiding punishments.147–149 Supporting this role are 
observations that the ACC contains individual neurons which respond to the presence of 
rewarding stimuli in ways which correspond to both the value of rewards144–146,150 and the 
effort151–153 required to obtain it. In line with these findings are hypotheses which suggest that 
ACC contributes to value-based decision-making behaviors.143–145 A growing number of human 
imaging studies also reported higher-order signals related to learning and exploration, which are 
oftentimes related to the expectation of uncertain outcomes4,9,154,155  
A recent study has identified a subset of neurons within VP that responded selectively to 
uncertainty. These cells showed a strong and consistent decrease in their firing before the 
delivery of uncertain rewards.16 This study contributes to other proposals that areas of pallidum- 
particularly the ventral extent of the structure- are implicated in the mechanisms of reward and 
motivation. For example, self-stimulation studies reported that animals will repeatedly press a 
lever for pallidal stimulations156–158 and that injection of bicuculline, a GABAA antagonist, 
resulted in increased food consumption.159–161 Conversely, lesion studies found that damaging 
areas of ventral pallidum (VP) resulted in failures to eat and drink in rodents162–164, indicating 
that the structure has a role in hedonic drive. Interestingly, one study of the ventral pallidum 
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found that lesioned animals not just reduce, but reverse, their pursuit of reward.163 Clinical 
studies in humans with damaged pallidum found that a patient once addicted to alcohol and other 
drugs no longer experienced cravings and reported a depressive mood and a generally 
despondent demeanor165; similarly, a second patient with damage to an overlapping area reported 
the inability to feel strong emotions and a general lack of motivation following the lesion.166  
But is there a striatal link between these cortical and basal ganglia uncertainty signals?  
Specific and overlapping areas of the dorsal striatum receive both glutamatergic projections from 
ACC and share mutual GABAergic connections with the ventral pallidum.46,48,50 Interestingly, 
these areas of ACC and pallidum are also highly overlapped with those where uncertainty-
responsive cells were reported.15,16 Could it be that these regions of the dorsal striatum contain a 
mechanism for signaling levels of reward uncertainty? Further, might this interconnected 
network of brain structures, some of which have a demonstrated role in predicting uncertain 
outcomes and motivating behavior towards primary rewards, contribute to an animal’s 
motivation to seek information about uncertain rewards? 
1.5 Summary 
 For a brain area or areas to be implicated in motivating behaviors towards seeking 
information, they must not only monitor the environment for levels of uncertainty surrounding 
future events, but also anticipate when information that resolves this uncertainty is available. 
Further, it must be demonstrated that interrupting the activity of these areas causally reduces 
information-seeking behaviors. In the following chapters we will describe the experimental 
results of testing areas of ACC and basal ganglia for responses to outcome uncertainty and 
anticipation of information about upcoming outcomes. In Chapter 2 we report a selective and 
anticipatory response to uncertain reward delivery within the striatum, specifically regions of 
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caudate nucleus and putamen which border the internal capsule (icbDS). We interrogate this 
response further across various reward schedules and task conditions. We continue with Chapter 
3 where we describe and compare the responses of anatomically-connected regions of ACC and 
basal ganglia (icbDS and VP) to reward uncertainty. We then test the response of each area when 
advance information about uncertain outcomes is available to determine if these areas are 
anticipating the delivery of uncertain outcomes, or if their response is to uncertainty resolution 
more broadly. Thereafter, we investigate looking behaviors which are associated with 
uncertainty and information-seeking and demonstrate that pharmacological manipulation of areas 
of this putative ‘information-seeking’ circuit results in decreased information-seeking biases. In 
sum, we identify a novel neural network which participates in signaling the resolution of reward 
uncertainty across multiple modalities and demonstrate that the activity of this network causally 











Chapter 2: Neurons in the primate dorsal striatum signal the 
uncertainty of object–reward associations 
Adapted from: 
J. Kael White & Ilya E. Monosov 
Neurons in the primate dorsal striatum signal the uncertainty of object-reward associations. 
Nature Communications, 2016. Article number: 12735 doi: 10.1038/ncomms1273 
 
To learn, obtain reward and survive, humans and other animals must monitor, approach 
and act on objects that are associated with variable or unknown rewards. However, the neuronal 
mechanisms that mediate behaviors aimed at uncertain objects are poorly understood. Here we 
demonstrate that a set of neurons in internal-capsule bordering regions of the primate dorsal 
striatum, within the putamen and caudate nucleus, signal the uncertainty of object–reward 
associations. Their uncertainty responses depend on the presence of objects associated with 
reward uncertainty and evolve rapidly as monkeys learn novel object–reward associations. 
Therefore, beyond its established role in mediating actions aimed at known or certain rewards, 
the dorsal striatum also participates in behaviors aimed at reward-uncertain objects. 
2.1 Introduction 
To survive, humans and other animals must act on objects that have been previously 
associated with certain or reliable rewards.107,167,168 However, learning, foraging and decision-
making also require animals to monitor, approach and act on objects associated with variable or 
unknown rewards4,18,155,169, even when the mean reward value of such uncertain objects is lower 
than that of other objects.1,170,171 To date, the mechanisms that direct behavior towards uncertain 
objects are not well understood. 
Expected (or certain) reward-driven behaviors are in part dependent on the caudate–
putamen complex73–75, also called the dorsal striatum (DS). In primates, the caudate nucleus in 
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particular has recently been shown to contain multiple mechanisms for directing gaze at objects 
associated with high reward values.76–79 Here we asked if the primate DS also contains a 
mechanism to support behavior aimed at objects associated with outcome uncertainty. 
Our experiments showed that a subset of neurons, mostly in the internal-capsule bordering 
regions of the DS (icbDS), was preferentially activated by visual objects associated with reward-
uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, the icbDS reward-uncertainty responses greatly depended on 
the presence of visual objects associated with reward uncertainty because they were reduced 
when the object was removed before the uncertain outcome was delivered. These uncertainty 
responses occurred when subjects were presented with objects that were associated with 
uncertain either due to the subjects’ lack of knowledge or due to known uncertainty (also called 
risk3,172) but carried no spatial or specific object information. Finally, during object–reward 
associative learning, icbDS neurons’ uncertainty responses evolved rapidly as monkeys learned 
novel object–reward associations.  
Our experiments suggest that uncertainty-sensitive neurons in the primate DS may play 
important roles in object-based behaviors under uncertainty. 
2.2 Materials and methods 
2.2.1 General procedures  
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for the neurophysiology 
experiments in the DS (Monkeys B who is 6 years old; and Monkey W who is 5.25 years old). 
All procedures conformed to the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were 
approved by the Washington University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. A plastic 
head holder and plastic recording chamber were fixed to the right side of the skull under general 
anesthesia and sterile surgical conditions. The chambers were tilted laterally by 35° and aimed at 
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the anterior portion of the striatum. After the monkeys recovered from surgery, they participated 
in the behavioral and neurophysiological experiments. 
2.2.2 Data acquisition  
While the monkeys participated in the behavioral procedures we recorded single neurons 
in the right DS. The recording sites were determined with 1 mm-spacing grid system and with 
the aid of magnetic resonance images (3 T) obtained along the direction of the recording 
chamber. This magnetic resonance imaging-based estimation of neuron recording locations was 
aided by custom-built software (PyElectrode). Single-unit recording was performed using glass-
coated electrodes (Alpha Omega). The electrode was inserted into the brain through a stainless-
steel guide tube and advanced by an oil-driven micromanipulator (MO-97A, Narishige). Signal 
acquisition (including amplification and filtering) was performed using Alpha Omega 44 kHz 
SNR system. Action potential waveforms were identified online by multiple time-amplitude 
windows with an additional template-matching algorithm (Alpha-Omega). Neuronal recording 
was restricted to single neurons that were isolated online. Neuronal and behavioral analyses were 
conducted offline in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA). 
Eye position was obtained with an infrared video camera (Eyelink, SR Research). 
Behavioral events and visual stimuli were controlled by Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions. Juice, used as reward, was delivered with a solenoid delivery 
reward system (CRIST Instruments). Juice-related anticipatory licking during the CS epoch was 
measured and quantified using previously described methods.17 
2.2.3 Behavioral tasks 
2.2.3.1 Reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (experiment 1) 
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The reward-probability and reward-amount behavioral procedure consisted of two blocks, 
a reward-probability block and a reward-amount block (Figure 2.1). In the reward-probability 
block, three visual fractal CSs were followed by a liquid reward (0.25 ml of juice) with 100, 50 
and 0% chance, respectively. In the reward-amount block, three CSs were followed by a liquid 
reward of 0.25, 0.125 and 0 ml, respectively. Thus, the expected values of the three CSs matched 
between the probability and amount blocks. To control for neuronal object preference, we used 
two fractal sets (that is, for every CS there were two different fractals). 
Each trial started with the presentation of a green trial-start cue at the center. The 
monkeys had to maintain fixation on the trial-start cue for 1 s; then the trial-start cue disappeared 
and one of the three CSs was presented pseudo randomly. After 2.5 s, the CS disappeared, and 
juice (if scheduled for that trial) was delivered. The monkeys were not required to fixate on the 
CSs. In each trial, the CS could appear in three locations: 10° to the left or to the right of the 
trial-start cue, or in the center. One block consisted of 18 trials with fixed proportions of trial 
types (each of the three CSs appears three times each block, 9/18 trials total). 
In the remainder of the trials in each block (9/18), the monkeys chose amongst the task 
CSs. Each trial started with the presentation of a purple trial-start cue at the center, and the 
monkeys had to fixate it for 0.5 s. After the monkey fixated on the trial start cue for 0.5 s, a 
choice array was presented consisting of two fractals used in the Pavlovian procedure (shown in 
Figure 2.1A). The monkey had to continue to fixate until the trial start cue disappeared (0.5 s). 
Monkeys then made saccadic eye movements to their preferred reward-associated fractals and 
fixated them for 0.75 s to indicate their choices. Then, the unchosen stimulus disappeared, and 




The inter-trial intervals ranged from 3 to 6 s. Approximately one in five inter-trial 
intervals contained uncued events (chosen randomly). These could be either a juice reward alone 
(0.25 ml) or an ∼70 dB 0.15 s auditory white noise burst paired with a brief change in screen 
color (same duration as the auditory stimulus). 
Neuronal recordings did not begin until the monkeys chose the CSs associated with 
higher expected value over CSs associated with lower expected value >90% of the time. The 
monkeys’ knowledge of the CSs was further confirmed when we measured the monkeys’ licking 
behavior. The magnitude of licking was correlated to the reward value of the fractals in the 
reward-probability block (P<0.001; Spearman’s rank correlation) and the reward-amount blocks 
(P<0.001; Spearman’s rank correlation). 
2.2.3.2 Five reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (experiment 2) 
The reward-probability and reward-amount behavioral procedure consisted of two blocks, 
a reward-probability block and a reward-amount block. The trial structure was the same as in 
experiment 1. However, here the reward-probability block contained five objects associated with 
five probabilistic reward predictions (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% of 0.25 ml of juice) and a reward-
amount block that contained five objects associated with 100% reward predictions of varying 
reward amounts (0.25, 0.1875, 0.125, 0.065 and 0 ml).17,18 One block consisted of 20 trials with 
fixed proportions of trial types (each of the five CSs appears four times each block). 
2.2.3.3 Trace reward-probability procedure (experiment 3) 
The temporal structure of this procedure was the same as in probability-amount 
procedure (experiment 1). The trace procedure contained four possible distinct CS fractals. The 
first two CSs were associated with 100% (CS 1) and 50% (CS 2) chance of 0.25 ml of juice. 
These CSs remained on the screen for 2.5 s and were followed by the scheduled reward outcome. 
17 
  
(same as in experiment 1). The other two CSs were also associated with 100% (CS 3) and 50% 
(CS 4) chance of 0.25 ml of juice but were only presented for 1 s. This was followed by a 1.5 s 
trace period, during which the screen did not contain any stimulus. The trace period was 
followed by the scheduled reward outcome. Therefore, in both trace and non-trace conditions, 
monkeys experienced two types of reward predictions (certain and uncertain) and experienced 
outcome delivery in 2.5 s after the initial CS presentation. 
2.2.3.4 Object learning procedure (experiment 4) 
Instead of using previously conditioned object fractals, monkeys were exposed to three 
novel CSs associated with 100, 50 and 0% chance of reward delivery. The task design and 
temporal structure of the trials were the same as in probability-amount procedure (experiment 1). 
However, the interleaved choice trials were choice trials amongst the three novel fractals. 
2.2.3.5 Appetitive-aversive procedure 
The procedure consisted of two alternating blocks: appetitive and aversive.15 In the 
appetitive block, three visual fractal CSs were followed by a liquid reward (0.4 ml of juice) with 
100%, 50% and 0% chance, respectively. In the aversive block, three visual fractal CSs were 
followed by an air puff with 100%, 50% and 0% chance, respectively. Airpuff (∼35 psi) was 
delivered through a narrow tube placed 6–8 cm from the monkey’s face. Temporal structure of 
the trials was the same as in other procedures, but here monkeys were not required to fixate the 
trial start cue. Each block consisted of 12 trials with fixed proportions of trial types (100%, four 
trials; 50%, four trials; 0%, four trials). 
2.2.4 Data processing and statistics 
Spike-density functions were generated by convolving spike times with a Gaussian filter 
(σ=50 ms). To display single neuron examples (Figs 1a, 3a, and 4a) spike-density functions were 
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generated by convolving spike times with a 100 ms Gaussian filter. A neuron was defined as 
uncertainty sensitive if its responses varied across the four possible reward predictions (100% 
0.25, 50% 0.25, 100% 0.125 and 0 ml of juice) (Kruskal–Wallis test, P<0.01; analysis window: 
100 ms after CS presentation until outcome) and if its response to the uncertain CS (50%) was 
significantly stronger or weaker than its responses to both 100 and 0% reward CSs (two-tailed 
rank-sum test; P<0.01). The same analysis window was used to study neuronal activity during 
the CS epoch in Figure 2.2C. 
To normalize task-event-related responses, we subtracted baseline activity (the last 
500 ms of the inter-trial interval) from the activity during the task-event-related measurement 
epoch. All statistical tests were two-tailed. For comparisons between two task conditions for 
each neuron, we used a rank-sum test, unless otherwise noted. For comparisons between two task 
conditions across the population average we used a paired signed-rank test, unless otherwise 
noted. Statistical threshold throughout this study is P<0.01 unless otherwise noted. 
To assess the sensitivity of individual uncertainty-selective striatal neurons to task-related 
variables in Experiment 1 (Figure 2.2C), we obtained their response indices (difference between 
neuronal responses to two conditions divided by their sum). To assess CS spatial location 
sensitivity, we compared responses to the 50% CS when it was shown 10° to the right versus 10° 
to the left of center. To assess object-feature sensitivity, we compared responses to two distinct 
50% CS fractal objects. Reward-value sensitivity was assessed by comparing neuronal responses 
to 100% 0.25 ml CS versus 0.125 ml CS. Reward-context sensitivity was assessed by comparing 
CS activity in certain reward trials (100% 0.25 and 0.125 ml CS trials) versus no reward trials. 
Uncertainty sensitivity was assessed by comparing responses to 50% reward CSs with 100% 
reward CSs. Reward prediction error sensitivity was assessed by comparing reward versus no-
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reward responses after the 50% reward prediction (in the 250 ms window after the outcome). 
Neuronal responses during experiments 2–4 were measured in the last 500 ms before the trial 
outcome. 
To calculate receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) that assessed neuronal 
discrimination of uncertainty, we compared spike-density functions of 100% reward CS trials 
and 50% reward CS trials. The analysis was structured so that receiver-operating characteristic 
area values >0.5 indicate that the activity in the 50% reward CS trials is greater than in the 100% 
reward CS trials values <0.5 indicate that the activity in the 100% reward CS trials is greater than 
in the 50% reward CS trials. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 DS neurons selectively signal reward uncertainty 
To test if the primate DS contains neurons that are preferentially activated by visual 
objects associated with reward-uncertain outcomes, we recorded 141 single neurons from DS 
while two monkeys (B, n=103 neurons; W, n=38 neurons) participated in a behavioral procedure 
that was composed of two distinct blocks: a reward-probability block, in which three visual 
conditioned stimuli (CSs) predicted a 0.25 ml juice reward with 100, 50 and 0% chance; and a 
reward-amount block, in which three CSs predicted 0.25, 0.125 and 0 ml of juice (experiment 1, 
Figure 2.1A). For each block, we used two fractal sets that could appear in one of three spatial 
locations. Monkeys’ knowledge of the task was tested with interleaved choice trials (Methods), 
and neuronal recordings did not begin until the monkeys chose the CSs associated with higher 
expected value over CSs associated with lower expected value >90% of the time (Figure 2.1B). 
Uncertainty-sensitive neurons were defined as those that varied their responses across the 
task CSs (Kruskal–Wallis test; P<0.01) and displayed significantly stronger responses to the 
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50% CS than to both 100 and 0% reward CSs or weaker responses to 50% CS than to both 100 
and 0% reward CSs (two-tailed rank-sum tests; P<0.01). We found that 45/141 neurons, mostly 
in the internal-capsule bordering regions of the striatum, were selectively activated by reward 
uncertainty (n=19 in monkey W; n=26 in monkey B). 0/141 neurons were selectively suppressed 
by uncertainty. An example uncertainty-sensitive (U+) neuron’s CS responses are shown in 
Figure 2.1C. Its activity increased following the presentation of the CS that predicted 0.25 ml of 
juice reward with 50% chance until the uncertain outcome was delivered and the uncertainty was 







Figure 2.1: (A) Experimental procedure for experiment 1. (B) Monkeys’ choice behavior in 
experiment 1. Choice percentage of a single reward-probability CS (x-axis) versus all the other 
reward probability CSs (red). Choice percentage of a single reward-amount CS (x-axis) versus 
all the other reward-amount CSs (black). Data compiled from 5602 trials. (C) Responses of a 
single uncertainty selective (U+) neuron in the internal capsule bordering region of the striatum 
to the presentation of six fractal objects (shown above rasters) associated with certain and 
uncertain predictions of juice reward. Dark blue raster plots indicate the activity in 50% CS trials 





All U+ neurons exhibited roughly similar responses (Figure 2.2A,B). On average, they 
were strongly activated by the presentation of the CS that predicted 0.25 ml of juice reward with 
50% chance. This activation was most often a ramp-like increase in activity, which continued 
until the uncertain outcome was delivered and the uncertainty was resolved (Figure 2.2A).  
Amongst single neurons, 44/45 U+ neurons responded more strongly to the CS object 
associated with 50% chance of 0.25 ml of juice than to the CS object associated with 0.125 ml of 
juice (Figure 2.2B) even though these CSs were associated with the same expected reward value. 
Further neuron-by-neuron analyses revealed that amongst the task features of experiment 
1, U+ neurons were consistently sensitive to reward uncertainty and to reward context (that is, 
difference between trials in which reward was possible versus trials in which rewards would not 
be delivered). This is shown in Figure 2.2C and in Supplementary Figure 2.2 for DS U+ neurons 
in caudate and putamen, separately. Most single U+ neurons did not encode information about 
expected values (defined as the difference between responses to objects associated with 0.25 and 
0.125 ml of juice), spatial- and object-feature parameters (Figure 2.2C), or aversive outcomes 
(Supplementary Figure 2.3). However, 24/45 U+ neurons discriminated reward-associated CSs 
from CSs associated with no outcome delivery (Figure 2.2C, this reward-related enhancement 
can also be observed in the average activity in Figure 2.2A). Also, on average, U+ neurons 
responded to the delivery of expected/certain rewards with a weak but consistent phasic 
excitation (Figure 2.2A; P<0.05; sign-rank test). The observations in Figure 2.2 indicate that 
while U+ neurons were preferentially dedicated to signaling reward uncertainty, they were also 
sensitive to reward context (or expectation) and reward delivery. 
While U+ neurons did not encode the locations of CS objects, thus far, it was unknown if 
they respond before or during saccades aimed at reward uncertain objects. To assess this further, 
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we studied the dynamics of U+ uncertainty selectivity during choice trials. We found that, on 
average, U+ uncertainty selectivity emerged after the monkeys fixated the object associated with 
reward uncertainty (Supplementary Figure 2.4). Therefore, U+ neurons did not trigger saccades 













Figure 2.2: (A) Average responses of 45 U+ neurons to different reward predictions in the 
reward-probability and reward-amount procedure. Shaded region represents standard error. The 
inset shows proportion of neurons (of 45 U+ neurons and of all 141 striatal neurons) displaying 
uncertainty selectivity during the CS epoch in time. (B) CS responses of 45 U+ neurons for 
different reward predictions in the reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (normalized 
to the maximum CS response; from 0 to 1). In all, 44/45 neurons had the highest response for the 
50% CS. (C) Sensitivity indices (Methods) for 45 striatal uncertainty-selective neurons for 
different behavioral/task variables. Asterisk above the histogram indicates significant deviation 
from 0 (P<0.01; sign-rank test). Significant individual neuron indices (P<0.01; Wilcoxon rank-
















Overall, the results of experiment 1 showed that the DS contains a subpopulation of 
neurons with striking sensitivity to objects associated with reward uncertainty. However, several 
important questions about these neurons remained unclear. First, are they sensitive to the level of 
uncertainty in a graded manner?17,18 Second, do U+ neurons signal internal states related to the 
expectation of reward or are their uncertainty responses dependent on external cues or objects? 
Third, can U+ neurons support object learning under uncertainty? To answer these important 
questions, we selectively recorded from U+ neurons in the DS in experiments 2–4. 
2.3.2 DS neurons are sensitive to the level of reward uncertainty 
To test if U+ neurons were sensitive to the level of reward uncertainty, in experiment 2, 
we recorded 20 U+ neurons (14 in monkey B and 6 in monkey W) in a behavioral procedure in 
which monkeys experienced a reward-probability block that contained five objects associated 
with five probabilistic reward predictions (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% of 0.25 ml of juice), and a 
reward-amount block that contained five objects associated with 100% reward predictions of 
varying reward amounts (0.25, 0.1875, 0.125, 0.065 and 0 ml of juice).15,16 The expected values 
of the five CSs in the probability block matched the expected values of the five CSs in the 
amount block. Reward-uncertainty neurons in DS were identified during online screening as 
neurons that responded to any of the uncertain conditioned stimuli (25, 50 or 75% reward). The 
same preselection criteria were used in subsequent experiments in this study and in our previous 
reports.17,18 
An example U+ neuron’s responses to the 10 CS objects are shown in Figure 2.3A. It 
responded most strongly to the presentation of the 50% CS object, and less strongly to the 
presentation of the 25 and 75% CS objects. Moreover, it did not respond to the presentation of 
objects associated with certain reward predictions (0 and 100% reward CS objects and CS 
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objects in the reward-amount block). A similar result can be observed across the population of 
U+ neurons (Figure 2.3B,C). U+ neurons’ average response was strongest for the presentation of 
the 50% CS object. Their responses were weaker for 25 and 75% reward-associated CS objects. 
On average, there was no significant difference between their responses to the 25% versus 75% 
CS objects, which have the same level of uncertainty but different expected values. Furthermore, 
as in experiment 1, during the reward-amount block, the neurons discriminated objects 
associated with rewards from objects associated with no reward (Figure 2.3C, black trace). In 






Figure 2.3: (A) Responses of a single uncertainty selective (U+) neuron to the presentation of 10 
fractal objects associated with certain and uncertain predictions of juice reward. (B) Average 
responses of 20 U+ neurons in the reward-probability block (left) and reward amount block 
(right). (C) Average normalized responses of 20 U+ neurons for probability (red) and amount 
(black) CSs. Asterisks indicate differences between CSs (**P<0.01; *P<0.025; paired sign-rank 
test). The inset shows the single neuron’s CS responses for different reward predictions in the 
reward-probability block (normalized to the maximum CS response; from 0 to 1). Numbers 
above the inset indicate the number of cells that exhibited the greatest response for 25, 50 or 75% 













2.3.3 U+ neurons are found most often in internal capsule-bordering regions of DS and are 
likely medium spiny neurons 
The location of all recorded U+ neurons is shown in Figure 2.4A. U+ neurons were most 
often found within the anterior–dorsal putamen and caudate nucleus regions that bordered the 
internal capsule (Figure 2.4A, Supplementary Figures 2.1-2.2), prominently in the anterior 
putamen. In addition to reconstructing neuron location by recording sites and depths, we further 
verified their location using structural MRI. Following the successful recording of a U+ neuron, 
the electrode was temporarily fixed at the recording site and its tip’s location in the target area 
was imaged (Figure 2.4B). We refer to this brain area as the icbDS. The low baseline discharge 
rate of U+ neurons (mostly <1 spikes per s; Figure 2.4C) suggests that they are medium spiny 














Figure 2.4: (A) Estimated locations of 45 U+ neurons (red dots) in the internal capsule bordering 
striatum shown on two coronal slices. Ranges of the neurons on each slice and the distance of 
each slice from the center of the anterior commissure (AC) are indicated. Black dots indicate 
other recorded neurons. Insert is the histogram of recording locations along the anterior-posterior 
axis. (B) A coronal T1 magnetic resonance (MR) image taken with a tungsten electrode at the 
location of an identified U+ neuron. (C) Histogram of baseline firing rates of recorded neurons. 
Inset shows spike duration (trough-to-trough) for all U+ neurons (left), non-uncertainty-selective 
putative medium spiny neurons (neurons with a baseline firing rate of < 3 spikes/second), and 
non-uncertainty-selective putative cholinergic interneurons (CHAT) neurons (neurons with a 
baseline firing rate >= 3 spikes/second). Error bars indicate standard errors. Single neuron data 
points are shown as scatters. Asterisks indicate significant differences (Wilcoxian rank sum test; 




2.3.4 icbDS uncertainty responses are object-dependent 
The results of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with two possible scenarios. First, U+ 
responses may signal internal states related to reward expectation, particularly with the 
expectation of uncertain rewards. A second scenario is that U+ responses may signal the 
uncertainty of the object–reward associations, rather than the internal state associated with 
reward uncertainty. To distinguish between these alternatives, monkeys were presented with four 
CSs (experiment 3). Two distinct CSs were associated with 100 and 50% chances of reward and 
were kept on the experimental presentation screen for 2.5 s, until the time of the trial outcome 
(same trial structure as in Figure 2.1A). Two other CSs were also associated with 100 and 50% 
chances of reward and were present on the screen for 1 s and outcomes were delivered in 1.5 s 
after the removal of the CSs (the 1.5 s period during which the CS is not present is referred to as 
a trace period). Therefore, for all CSs, reward was delivered 2.5 s after CS onset. Monkey 
performance indicated that they understood the procedure and were similarly motivated by trace 
and no-trace 50% reward predictions (Supplementary Figure 2.5). 
We identified U+ neurons in icbDS and recorded their activity in this paradigm (n=32 
neurons; 11 in monkey W and 21 in monkey B). An example U+ neuron is shown in Figure 
2.5A. This neuron robustly discriminated 50% reward-associated CS object (uncertain condition) 
from the 100% reward-associated CS object (P<0.01; rank-sum test). Surprisingly, the removal 
of the uncertain CS (trace condition) before the outcome was delivered completely abolished its 
uncertainty selectivity (Figure 2.5A, green and blue traces). Similar results were found for most 
of the U+ neurons (Figure 2.5B). The discriminability of striatal uncertainty signals was greatly 
diminished when the uncertain object was not present at the time of the outcome (Figure 2.5C). 
Many U+ neurons’ uncertainty signals were completely abolished (Figure 2.5B,C). These results 
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Figure 2.5: (A) Responses of a single U+ neuron to 100 and 50% reward predictions without a 
trace period (CS objects remained until the outcome) (black and red), and with a trace period (CS 
objects disappeared after 1 s) (green and blue). (B) In all, 22/32 neurons displayed significant 
differences in reward-uncertainty responses across the no-trace and trace conditions (red; rank-
sum test; P<0.01; 26/32 were significant with a 0.05 threshold). All significant changes were 
reductions of uncertainty responses. Normalization was performed by subtracting 100% CS 
responses from 50% CS responses (for trace and no-trace conditions, separately). (C) Single 
neuron (insets above) and population reward-uncertainty discriminability was greatly diminished 




























In the basal forebrain (particularly in its medial regions), some neurons also signal reward 
uncertainty with ramp-like responses17, however, additional experiments revealed that their 
uncertainty-selective signals persist during the same trace-conditioning procedure used to study 
U+ neurons (Supplementary Figure 2.5). Consistent with this observation, other reward-related 
signals are preserved during trace conditioning in brain regions that are interconnected with the 
basal forebrain, such as in the dorsal raphe175 and in the amygdala.176 These observations suggest 
that basal forebrain and related limbic structures signal values and uncertainty of internal states 
(perhaps somewhat independently of the external environment), whereas the U+ neurons in the 





























Figure 2.6: (A) Single neuron’s responses (shown as single trial rasters) to the presentation of 
three novel objects shown in the order of the monkey’s experience (bottom to top). (B) Binned 
neuronal population response across learning (30 learning sessions, 30 neurons) shown 
separately for 100, 50 and 0% reward-associated novel objects. Asterisks indicate significant 
variance across the three conditions (P<0.01; Kruskal–Wallis test). Neuronal responses are 
shown separately for Pavlovian and choice trials in Supplementary Figure 2.6. (C) Monkeys’ 
choices during learning. Proportion of choices of the higher-valued fractal CS objects during 
randomly interleaved choice trials (binned like neuronal activity in B). **P<0.01, *P<0.05 (sign-









2.3.5 icbDS uncertainty responses are rapidly shaped by learning 
The previous data prompted us to assess how U+ neuronal responses are shaped by the 
learning of novel object–reward associations (experiment 4). Thus far, we had tested the 
responses of U+ neurons to reward uncertainty arising from knowledge about reward variability 
associated with 50% reward CSs (also called known-uncertainty or risk). However, if uncertain 
object–reward signals in the DS contribute to object learning, then U+ neurons should also signal 
uncertainty that is due to a lack of previous object–outcome associations (also called ambiguity)- 
an uncertainty that can be identified and resolved by learning. To test this, we recorded the 
activity of identified U+ neurons in a Pavlovian procedure in which three novel fractals were 
used as CSs associated with 100, 50 and 0% reward probabilities (n=30 neurons; 11 in monkey 
W and 19 in monkey B). One example U+ neuron is shown in Figure 2.6A. At the start of 
learning, this neuron showed a strong increase in response to all the novel CSs. As the CSs were 
repeatedly experienced, the neuronal activity started to decrease for certain CSs (0 and 100%) 
and remained roughly the same for the reward-uncertain CS (50% reward prediction). The 
population of 30 U+ neurons shows a similar pattern (Figure 2.6B and Supplementary Figure 
2.6). The neuronal responses to certain object–reward associations decreased as the monkeys 
learned (Figure 2.6C). These results demonstrated that U+ neurons signal object–reward 
uncertainty of unknown or novel objects and that the DS uncertainty responses can be rapidly 
shaped by learning, even within a single experimental session. 
2.4 Discussion  
In the caudate–putamen complex we found a population of neurons that signal 
uncertainty of object–reward associations. These U+ neurons were often found in the icbDS. 
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Their uncertainty-selective responses depended on the presence of objects associated with 
reward uncertainty and evolved rapidly as monkeys learned novel object–reward associations. 
Which brain regions supply reward uncertainty signals to U+ neurons? Their average location in 
the striatum may provide a clue. U+ neurons were most often found within the anterior putamen 
and caudate regions that bordered the internal capsule, prominently in the anterior putamen. 
icbDS receives inhibitory inputs from the ventral pallidum177, where some neurons are inhibited 
by reward uncertainty (Supplementary Figure 2.7).16 Given the uncertainty-excitatory responses 
of many icbDS neurons (Figure 2.2), we hypothesize that the inhibition of pallidal neurons by 
uncertainty may open a gate, so that U+ neurons can selectively respond to cortical inputs 
carrying sensory information about objects90,108 and about their reward value or uncertainty.20 
Although precisely which cortical regions send uncertainty and other signals to U+ neurons 
remains to be assessed, recent work has demonstrated the presence of reward-uncertainty 
responsive cells within regions of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).15 Notably, areas of DS that 
overlap with where we report these U+ neurons receive excitatory inputs from this region of 
ACC.48,49,50(p) The differences in response to uncertainty of ACC and icbDS, however, have yet 
to be assessed. 
The task responses of striatal U+ neurons differentiated them from reward uncertainty-
selective neurons in the anterodorsal septum and the medial basal forebrain. For example, during 
object learning, anterodorsal septal uncertainty-selective neurons responded preferentially to 
knowledge-based uncertainty (often called risk), after monkeys learned the uncertain stimulus–
response association.18 In contrast, during a similar object-learning task, U+ neurons responded 
strongly to novel stimuli, whose conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus relationship was 
not yet learned (Figure 2.6). Unlike U+ neurons, medial basal forebrain reward uncertainty-
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sensitive neurons slowly learned to discriminate between certain and uncertain reward-predicting 
objects.17 This slow learning was not correlated with the fast time course of the monkeys’ 
object–reward associative learning. 17 These data are consistent with the observation that there 
are no known connections from the medial basal forebrain or septum to the striatum and suggest 
that U+ neurons belong to a mostly distinct system for signaling uncertainty of objects that may 
be particularly well suited to contribute to object learning. 
It is noteworthy that U+ neurons did not encode all types of uncertainty, or only 
uncertainty.3,18 First, they did not respond to uncertainty about punishments. Second, on average, 
they discriminated reward-associated CSs from reward-unassociated CSs (Figure 2.2A,C). In 
fact, similar reward-related tonic activity shifts were observed in other neurons that encode 
reward uncertainty.15,16 It remains to be tested whether they are due to context value (or 
relevance), or if they are due to uncertainty that could exist even during the expectation of 
‘certain’ rewards (for example, due to errors in the estimation of reward timing). Third, U+ 
neurons’ uncertainty responses were abolished by the removal of the CS before the trial outcome 
(during trace conditioning). This suggests that striatal U+ neurons’ responses depended on the 
presence of the uncertain CS object. This finding further differentiated striatal U+ neurons from 
uncertainty-enhanced neurons in the medial basal forebrain whose uncertainty selectivity 
persisted when the CS object was removed before the trial outcome (Supplementary Figure 2.5). 
Our study in monkeys and a previous human brain-imaging study10 suggest that icbDS is 
a prominent node for processing information about reward uncertainty. However, it is possible 
that there are other striatal mechanisms for signaling uncertainty, and/or for integrating 
uncertainty with stimulus-feature information, movement kinematics and values.178,179 Indeed, 
different areas of the primate striatum learn and signal values in distinct manners73,76,78,79,106,178–
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181 to support their different roles in action, decision-making, and learning and 
memory.48,49,73,76,77,79,90,106,178,179,182 How uncertainty guides computations across different striatal 
subregions must therefore be an important direction of future studies. Objects in the environment 
are important because they signal rewards or dangers, or because they represent an opportunity 
to learn and change one’s state. In this study, we showed that the basal ganglia signals reward 
uncertainty of object–reward associations—a critical variable for monitoring and learning from 
objects. These results demonstrate a novel role for internal-capsule bordering putamen and 
caudate in controlling behaviors in uncertain contexts. 

















Supplementary Figure 2.1: Supplementary information about the location of U+ neurons 
(A) Estimated locations of U+ neurons (red dots) in the internal capsule bordering striatum 
shown on two coronal slices for each monkey. Formatting, anterior-posterior ranges of the 
neurons on each slice, and the distance of each slice from the center of the anterior commissure 
(AC) are as in Figure 2.4. (B) Three dimensional scatters of neuronal locations relative to the 
center-top of the AC. Red dots – U+, Black dots – other recorded striatal neurons, small black 
dots – neurons that were encountered (but not recorded) during experiments to map the extent of 
the caudate and putamen and to verify locations of the internal capsule and AC. Inset – locations 
of recorded neurons from two monkeys shown in two planes (medial-lateral versus dorsal-
ventral) relative to the center-top of the AC. 95% confidence ellipse (red) around the U+ neurons 
includes 44 U+ neurons and 65 other recorded striatal neurons; 13 of those 65 neurons displayed 
significant correlations with the expected reward values of the CSs (correlations were assessed as 
relationship between the size of expected rewards in the reward amount block and neuronal 
activity during the CS epoch; Spearman’s rank correlations; p<0.05; tested using a permutation 
test; 10,000 shuffles). (C) U+ neurons shown for two monkeys separately (magenta and blue) 
relative to the center-top of the AC. Each plot compares two different anatomical planes. 95% 




Supplementary Figure 2.2: Sensitivity indices comparing U+ neurons in the putamen versus 
caudate nucleus. Sensitivity indices (same as in Figure 2.2) are shown separately for putamen 
and caudate U+ neurons. There were no significant differences between neuronal task-responses 



















Supplementary Figure 2.3: U+ neurons’ responses in the Appetitive-Aversive procedure. For 
each neuron (indicated by a circle; n=15; Monkey B), we plotted the differences in response 
magnitude between 50% reward CS and 100% reward CS (x-axis) and between 50% CS and 0% 
reward CS responses (y-axis). The responses in the appetitive and aversive blocks are shown 
separately (left and right). Filled circles indicate neurons that displayed significant variability 




Supplementary Figure 2.4: U+ neurons’ responses during choice. (A) Choice-trial structure (left) 
and the monkeys’ choice behavior (right). Monkeys made a choice between two CSs among the 
six well-learned CSs (three indicating reward amounts, and three indicating reward 
probabilities). The inset shows the proportion of trials the monkeys chose 0, 0.125, 50% 0.25, 
and 0.25 CSs over all other CSs. (B) Average normalized neuronal responses of U+ neurons 
during choice trials sorted by the monkeys’ choices. Specifically, neuronal activity was sorted 
into trials in which the monkey chose the object associated with 0.25 ml of juice, (black), the 
object associated with 50% of 0.25 ml of juice (red), or 0.125 ml of juice (blue). Asterisks above 
task epochs indicate statistical differences amongst the 3 trial types (first Kruskal Wallis test 
p<0.01 across three trial types, then Wilcoxon rank sum tests; p<0.01; inset shows the meanings 
of asterisk color). Normalization was done by subtracting the average activity during trial start 




Supplementary Figure 2.5: Trace conditioning: behavior and comparison of striatum and basal 
forebrain U+ neurons’ responses (A) Licking behavior of two monkeys during trace conditioning 
(measured from CS presentation to outcome). The licking behavior during 50% reward trace and 
non-trace trials was not significantly different (p>0.05). Asterisks indicate significant differences 
(p<0.05; Wilcoxon rank sum test). Error bars denote standard error. (B) Comparison between 
ramping uncertainty selective neurons in the icbDS and the medial basal forebrain (BF). Average 
normalized responses of icbDS U+ neurons (left; n = 32) and BF uncertainty selective neurons 
(right; n=17) during trace and no-trace conditions. Responses are shown for 100% (black) and 
50% (red) CSs separately. Asterisk denotes significant change (sign rank test; p<0.05). (C) 
Uncertainty response % change (trace versus no-trace) for icbDS and BF. Asterisk denotes 













Supplementary Figure 2.6: U+ neurons’ responses during learning for Pavlovian and choice 
trials. Binned neuronal population response across learning (30 learning sessions) shown 
separately for 100, 50, and 0% reward associated novel objects. Asterisks indicate significant 




Supplementary Figure 2.7: The ventral pallidum as one source of uncertainty signals in the 
striatum. The ventral pallidal regions are known to send inhibitory projections to icbDS. These 
regions contain uncertainty-suppressed neurons (Ledbetter, Chen, Monosov, 2016; Journal of 
Neuroscience). Here, we present a schematic of a hypothetical gating of icbDS by pallidal inputs. 
When the pallidum is inhibited by uncertainty, cortical inputs can further shape and drive the 
icbDS response. We recorded the activity of 23 uncertainty-sensitive neurons in the ventral 
pallidum while two monkeys (B and W) experienced familiar/over-trained CSs associated with 
0, 25, 50, 75, and 100 % chance of reward delivery (same as in Experiment 2). 18 neurons were 
suppressed by uncertainty, 5 were enhanced. Consistent with the proposed circuit, we found that 
the average CS responses of the 18 VP uncertainty-suppressed neurons (blue) form 
approximately an inverted mirror image of the response function of icbDS U+ neurons (shown in 
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Humans and other animals often express a strong desire to know the uncertain rewards 
their future has in store, even when there is no way to use this information to influence the 
outcome.23,26,28,29,31,171,183 However, while much is known about how the brain predicts rewards 
after information has been received184, it is unknown how the brain predicts information itself, 
and how such neural predictions motivate information seeking behavior. Here we show that 
neurons in a network of interconnected subregions of the primate anterior cingulate cortex and 
basal ganglia predict the moment of gaining information about uncertain future rewards. We 
demonstrate that animals preferentially direct their gaze at objects that resolve uncertainty and 
that pharmacological disruptions of this network reduce the motivation to seek information. 
These findings demonstrate a novel cortico-basal ganglia mechanism responsible for motivating 
actions to resolve uncertain situations by seeking knowledge about the future. 
3.1 Introduction 
Stimuli do not often predict outcomes with absolute certainty. As such, humans and 
nonhuman animals have evolved complex nervous systems which can make predictions about 
future outcomes and adjust behaviors to seek information that can resolve uncertainty about 
these predictions. By seeking information that reduces uncertainty about the future, animals can 
maximize the value of interacting with environmental objects. Therefore, a mechanism for 
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signaling when uncertainty surrounding an outcome will be resolved and for directing behavior 
towards seeking information that reduces uncertainty could be useful in complex environments. 
Information-seeking behavior has been demonstrated in a range of species. Interestingly, 
findings in both humans185 and nonhuman primates26–28 demonstrated that the brain screens for 
opportunities to resolve uncertainty by obtaining information. Further, these representations are 
present in areas of the brain implicated in reinforcement learning and motivational control26,27 
and signals in these areas produce information prediction errors26 much like the reward 
prediction errors which in-part guide reward-seeking behaviors.34,186–188 Interestingly, advance 
information about the delivery of future reward is valued enough that humans31 and nonhuman 
animals28 will sacrifice levels of this reward in order to obtain this information. Despite its 
importance to survival and its value to human and nonhuman subjects alike, little is known about 
how and where in the brain information is valued and where information-seeking behaviors are 
promoted. 
Insight into how this may be accomplished comes from research investigating how the 
brain promotes reward-seeking behaviors. The brain has populations of neurons which encode 
RPEs35,37 and help guide behaviors towards primary rewards.32,36,189 The activity of these cells is 
sustained from when the reward is first predicted and ramps to the expected time of reward 
delivery.184 In many cases, these reward prediction signals were directly linked to online reward-
seeking behavior; the strength of these signals are correlated to reward-seeking behaviors77,190–192 
and disrupting the signals alters reward seeking.193,194 
But what are the requirements for a neural network to motivate behavior towards 
information-seeking behavior? It must (A) monitor the level of uncertainty about future events, 
(B) anticipate the time when information will become available to resolve the uncertainty, and 
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(C) causally motivate behavior to obtain information. Here we demonstrate that these criteria are 
met by an anatomically interconnected network comprising three areas of the primate brain: 
ACC and two subregions of the basal ganglia (BG), the internal-capsule-bordering portion of the 
dorsal striatum (icbDS) and the anterior pallidum including anterior globus pallidus and the 
pallidum (Pal). 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 General procedures 
Four adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for behavioral, recording, 
and inactivation experiments (Animals B, R, Z, and W). All procedures conformed to the Guide 
for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the Washington University 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. A plastic head holder and plastic recording 
chamber were fixed to the skull under general anesthesia and sterile surgical conditions. The 
chambers were tilted laterally by 35-40° and aimed at the anterior cingulate and the anterior 
regions of the basal ganglia. After the animals recovered from surgery, they participated in the 
experiments.  
3.2.2 Data acquisition 
While the animals participated in the behavioral tasks we recorded single neurons in the 
anterior cingulate cortex, internal capsule-bordering regions of the dorsal striatum, and anterior 
pallidum including the ventral pallidum and the anterior-most part of the globus pallidus internal 
segment. Electrode trajectories were determined with 1 mm-spacing grid system and with the aid 
of MR images (3T) obtained along the direction of the recording chamber. This MRI-based 
estimation of neuron recording locations was aided by custom-built software (PyElectrode195). In 
addition, in order to further verify the location of recording sites, after a subset of experiments 
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the electrode was temporarily fixed in place at the recording site and the electrode tip’s location 
in the target area was verified by MRI (Figure 3.1). 
Single-unit recording was performed using glass-coated electrodes (Alpha Omega). The 
electrode was inserted through a stainless-steel guide tube and advanced by an oil-driven 
micromanipulator (MO-97A, Narishige). Signal acquisition (including amplification and 
filtering) was performed using Alpha Omega 44 kHz SNR system. Action potential waveforms 
were identified online by multiple time-amplitude windows with an additional template matching 
algorithm (Alpha-Omega). Neuronal recording was restricted to single neurons that were isolated 
online. Neuronal and behavioral analyses were conducted offline in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, 
MA). 
Eye position was obtained with an infrared video camera (Eyelink, SR Research). 
Behavioral events and visual stimuli were controlled by Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions. Juice, used as reward, was delivered with a solenoid delivery 
reward system (CRIST Instruments). Juice-related licking was measured and quantified using 
previously described methods.15  
3.2.3 Behavioral tasks 
We analyzed data recorded from several behavioral tasks which can be grouped into three 
major categories: standard uncertainty tasks, information viewing task (used for recording), and 
information seeking task (used for inactivations). 
3.2.3.1 Standard uncertainty tasks  
These tasks are described in detail in previous work.15,18 They each used a distinct set of 
fractal visual CSs with different associated outcomes. However, they all shared the following 
general outline. Animals were presented with a small white circular trial start cue at the center of 
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the screen. In some tasks animals were required to fixate the trial start cue for a fixed duration 
(typically 0.5-1 s) for the trial to continue; if they failed to fulfill this requirement within a grace 
period (typically 5 s) the trial would be considered an error, they would receive a timeout, and 
the trial would repeat. In other tasks animal were not required to fixate the trial start cue; it was 
simply shown for a fixed duration (typically 1 s). After the trial start period, the trial start cue 
disappeared and a fractal visual conditioned stimulus (CS) appeared on the screen for a fixed 
duration (2.5 s). The CS was randomly positioned at one of three locations: the center of the 
screen, the left side of the screen, or the right side of the screen (at 10 or 12.5 degrees 
eccentricity). In some sessions only the left and right locations were used. Animals were not 
required to gaze at or interact with the CS in any way. At the end of the CS period, the CS 
disappeared and simultaneously the trial’s outcome was delivered. Finally, there was an inter-
trial interval during which the screen was blank (typically randomized between 1-8 s, with 
different durations for different animals and tasks). In some sessions, a small fraction of inter-
trial intervals included the unexpected presentation of different salient events, which could be 
appetitive (juice), aversive (an airpuff, ~35 psi, delivered through a narrow tube placed ~6-8 cm 
from the face15), or audiovisual (an auditory tone sounding and the screen flashing white).  
The standard uncertainty tasks primarily differed in their CSs, outcomes, and block structure: 
- Task A15: Trials were presented in two distinct blocks. In the Probability block, there 
were five CSs associated with 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100% probabilities of 0.25 mL juice. In 
the Amount block, there were five CSs associated with 100% probability of 0, 0.0625, 
0.125, 0.1875, and 0.25 mL juice. Hence for each CS in the Probability block there was a 
matched CS in the Amount block that was associated with an identical mean amount of 
juice, but for which the outcome was certain rather than probabilistic. Each block 
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consisted of 20 trials (4 presentations of each of its 5 CSs, shuffled in a randomized 
order). The two blocks were presented repeatedly in an alternating manner, with each 
block continuing until its 20 trials were correctly completed and then immediately 
transitioning into the other block. 
- Task B16: Same as task A, except it used three Probability CSs (0, 50, 100%) and the 
three corresponding Amount CSs (0, 0.125, 0.25 mL), and each block consisted of 6 or 9 
trials (2 or 3 presentations of each of its 3 CSs). In some sessions, blocks also included 
interleaved choice trials in which two CSs were presented and animals were allowed to 
choose between them with a saccade; our analysis here is of non-choice trials. 
- Task C15: Trials were presented in two distinct blocks. In the Appetitive block, there were 
three CSs associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of 0.4 mL juice. In the Aversive 
block, there were three CSs associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of airpuffs. 
Each block consisted of 12 trials (4 presentations of each of its 3 CSs). 
- Task D15: There were 9 CSs. Four CSs were associated with 25, 50, 75, and 100% 
probabilities of 0.4 mL juice. Four other CSs were associated with 25, 50, 75, and 100% 
probabilities of airpuff. One final CS was associated with no outcome (i.e. 0% probability 
of both reward and airpuff). The CSs were presented in a pseudorandom order. 
- Task E: Three CSs were associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of 0.25 mL juice. 
The CSs were presented in a pseudorandom order. 
3.2.3.2 Information viewing task  
This task began with the appearance of a small circular trial start cue at the center of the 
screen which animals were required to fixate for a fixed duration (typically 0.5 or 1 s). The trial 
start cue then disappeared and was followed in succession by a CS that was displayed for a fixed 
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duration (typically 1 s), which was then replaced by a cue at the same location that was displayed 
for a fixed duration (typically 2 s). The cue then disappeared, and simultaneously the outcome 
was delivered. The trial then completed with a 1 s inter-trial interval. The CSs were presented 
randomly on either the left or right side of the screen (10 degrees eccentricity). There were three 
Info CSs that yielded juice reward (0.25 mL) with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities, and were 
followed by one of two informative cues whose color indicated the trial’s outcome (Figure 
3.3A). There were three analogous Noinfo CSs that also yielded juice reward with 0, 50, and 
100% probabilities, but which were followed by one of two non-informative cues whose colors 
were randomized on each trial and hence did not convey any information about the trial’s 
outcome (Figure 3.3A). In some sessions Noinfo CSs were followed by a single non-informative 
visual cue. There was no apparent difference in behavior or neural activity between sessions with 
one or two non-informative cues; hence their data was pooled. The 6 total CSs were presented in 
a pseudo-random order.  
3.2.3.3 Information seeking task  
This task also began with animals fixating a trial start cue for a fixed duration, followed by a 
CS presented randomly on either the left or right side of the screen.  However, the trial start cue 
remained visible for a fixed duration after CS onset during which animals were required to 
maintain fixation on the trial start cue (typically for 1 s in animal B, 0.25 s in animal R, and 0.5 
or 1 s in animal Z). Fixation breaks were treated as errors: the screen went blank, there was a 1-2 
s penalty delay period, and then the trial repeated from the beginning. After the fixation period, 
the trial start cue disappeared, and animals were free to move their eyes. The task then detected 
the first moment when animals gazed at the CS, defined as the eye position entering a square 
window centered on the CS (i.e. when horizontal and vertical eye positions were within 4° of the 
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center of the CS). If animals gazed at an Info CS it was immediately replaced with the 
appropriate informative cue; if they gazed at a Noinfo CS it was immediately replaced with a 
non-informative cue; if they did not gaze at a CS, no cue was shown. Importantly, regardless of 
their gaze behavior, all stimuli disappeared and the outcome was delivered at the same, fixed 
time after CS onset on all trials in the session (typically 3 s). Thus, gazing at the CS gave animals 
access to the cues but did not give them earlier access to the juice reward. In the version of the 
information seeking task used for inactivation experiments and controls, there were only two CSs 
– an Info CS and a Noinfo CS – that were both associated with 50% probability of 0.25 mL juice 
reward. By ensuring that the probability, amount, and timing of juice reward were identical for 
all CSs on all trials, we minimized the possibility that gaze behavior to the CSs could be 
influenced by different reward expectations or reward prediction errors induced by CS onset.  
In some sessions, neurons recorded using the information viewing task were also recorded in 
interleaved trials or in separate blocks with a version of the information seeking task. These 
information seeking trials were indicated to the animal by a distinct green color of the trial start 
cue (Figure 3.7A). These trials also used six CSs: Info and Noinfo CSs associated with 0, 50, and 
100% reward probability. These six fractal CSs on information seeking trials were visually 
identical to the analogous six fractal CSs used for information viewing trials. Information-related 
neural responses in these information seeking trials were typically similar to activity in 
information viewing trials (e.g. activity ramping up to the time the informative cue would 
become available and to the time a non-informed outcome would be delivered). Note, however, 
that the task design of information seeking trials induced a link between gaze and receipt of 
information: gaze behavior was not completely ‘free’ because it was required if the animal 
wanted to produce the cue, and the cue appeared with variable timing depending on the animal’s 
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behavior. Therefore, to be conservative, data from the information seeking trials was only 
included in our analysis of information signals (Figure 3.4) in a small number of neurons for 
which no data from information viewing trials was available (n=4 ACC neurons in monkey Z). 
Analysis of neural activity in Figure 3.2 and Supplementary Figures 3.1-3.2 uses data from 
all neurons recorded using standard uncertainty tasks in which CSs were associated with all five 
reward probabilities (tasks A and D). Analysis of neural activity during information tasks (Figure 
3.4) uses data from neurons recorded using an information task. 
3.2.4 Muscimol injections  
On muscimol injection sessions, a 33-gauge cannula was inserted through a 23-gauge 
guide tube into a grid hole and to a depth previously identified to be in icbDS or Pal and to 
contain information-related neurons (Supplementary Figure 3.3). The other end of the cannula 
was connected to a 10 µL Hamilton syringe. Behavioral data from the information seeking task 
were collected in blocks of 70-150 correct trials. Before the injection we collected a ‘pre-
injection’ behavioral data set from the animal performing the information seeking task, typically 
for one block (median: 96 correct trials, standard deviation: 24, range: 48-164). After recording 
the baseline data, we used a manual syringe pump (Stoelting) or automated syringe pump 
(Harvard Apparatus) to inject muscimol dissolved in saline. Muscimol concentrations were 8 
mg/mL, injection rates were typically 0.1 µL/min (range: 0.09-0.2), and injection volumes 
ranged from 1.0-2.5 µL in icbDS and 0.545-1.4 µL in Pal. After each injection we collected a 
‘post-injection’ behavioral data set (median: 303 correct trials, standard deviation: 157, range: 
43-839). All pre- and post-injection blocks of data were included in our analysis regardless of the 
animal’s response times or other gaze behavior, as long as the animal remained engaged in the 
task (i.e. generally initiating trials quickly and performing them correctly). On two sessions pre-
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injection data from the same day was not available, so we used the first block of behavioral data 
collected from the same animal on days immediately before or after the session to obtain a 
comparable baseline. On saline injection control sessions, the same procedure was followed 
except that only the saline vehicle was injected (with the same volumes previously used for 
muscimol injections). On sham control sessions, the same procedure was followed (including 
pauses in procedure to simulate setting up the cannula, advancing the cannula, performing the 
injection, etc.), except no cannula was inserted and no injection was given. 
3.2.5 Data analysis  
Neurons recorded in the standard uncertainty tasks were included in our dataset if they 
showed significant responsiveness to uncertainty (activity on uncertain reward CS trials 
significantly different from both 0% reward CS trials and 100% reward CS trials, rank-sum tests, 
both p < 0.05 and both differences with the same sign). For this purpose, activity was measured 
in a broad time window encompassing the CS period to avoid making any assumptions about the 
time course of neural responses (0.1-2.5 s after CS onset). The neuron’s sign of uncertainty 
coding was defined as +1 if its ROC area for discriminating between uncertain reward CS trials 
vs pooled data from 0% and 100% reward CS trials was > 0.5, and defined as -1 if its ROC area 
was < 0.5. Similarly, to avoid making any assumptions about the nature or time course of 
information-related signals, all neurons recorded in the information tasks were included in our 
dataset if they were classified online as potentially uncertainty responsive based on their activity 
on Noinfo trials or during any other uncertainty-related task. The neuron’s sign of uncertainty 
coding was defined in the same manner as in standard uncertainty tasks, using activity from 
Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s window before outcome onset. 
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Neural activity was converted to normalized activity as follows. Each neuron’s spiking 
activity was smoothed with a causal exponential kernel (mean = 30 ms) and then z-scored and 
sign-normalized using the following procedure. The neuron’s average activity timecourse 
aligned at CS onset was calculated for each condition (defined here as each combination of CS 
and cue). These average activity timecourses from the different conditions were all concatenated 
into a single vector, and its mean and standard deviation were calculated. Henceforth, all future 
analyses converted that neuron’s firing rates to normalized activity by (1) subtracting the mean 
of that vector, (2) dividing by the standard deviation of that vector, (3) multiplying by the 
neuron’s sign of uncertainty coding. Thus, normalized activity of +1 in a given task condition 
means that the neuron’s firing rate deviated away from its average firing rate in the same 
direction that it responded to uncertainty, by an amount equivalent to 1 SD of its overall 
distribution of average firing rates during the task. 
Neural uncertainty signals were calculated in specific time windows (e.g. pre-cue, pre-
outcome, etc.) as the ROC area for distinguishing activity on uncertain reward CS trials (25, 50, 
and 75%) from pooled data from 0% and 100% certain reward trials. In the information viewing 
task uncertainty signals were calculated separately for Info and Noinfo trials. To visualize their 
timecourses, they were calculated on neural activity at millisecond resolution after activity was 
smoothed with a gaussian kernel (SD = 50 ms) and sign-normalized based on the neuron’s sign 
of uncertainty coding on Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s pre-outcome window (Figure 3.4). The Info Cue 
Anticipation Index was defined as the difference between its uncertainty signal for Info and 
Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s pre-cue time window. Hence the index was positive if a neuron had a 
higher uncertainty signal in anticipation of Info CSs, and negative if a neuron had a higher 
uncertainty signal in anticipation of Noinfo CSs. The Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index was 
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defined as the difference between its uncertainty signals computed on two different time 
windows on Noinfo trials: a 0.5 s pre-outcome window, and a 0.5 s post-cue window (0.15-0.65 
s after cue onset). Hence the index was positive if a neuron’s uncertainty signal grew more 
positive between the cue and outcome, and negative if it grew more negative between the cue 
and outcome. Neurons were classified as information-responsive if their Info Cue Anticipation 
Index was significantly different from 0 (p < 0.05, permutation tests conducted by comparing the 
index calculated on the true data to the distribution of indexes calculated on 20000 permuted 
datasets that shuffled the assignment of trials to Info and Noinfo conditions). Neurons were 
classified as having a significant Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index using the analogous 
permutation test (p < 0.05, shuffling the assignment of data to the post-cue and pre-outcome time 
windows). For analysis of information-oriented gaze behavior, the same two indexes were 
calculated for each neuron except that instead of using neural data they used the behavioral gaze 
data (equal to 1 for milliseconds when the animal’s gaze was classified as being in the stimulus 
window and 0 otherwise). Finally, to plot the timecourse of uncertainty signals from the 
population including neurons with different signs of uncertainty coding, the normalized 
uncertainty signal (Figure 3.4F) was defined as the ‘absolute’ ROC area, i.e. as 0.5 + 
|Uncertainty signal – 0.5|. Thus if the uncertainty signal was excitatory (> 0.5) it was left intact, 
while it was flipped to become > 0.5 if it was inhibitory (< 0.5). 
Latency of uncertainty coding. Each neuron’s smoothed normalized activity aligned at CS 
onset was further smoothed with a 101 ms causal boxcar kernel and then tested at each 
millisecond after CS onset for whether it met the following criteria: (1) highly significant ROC 
area for distinguishing pooled data from uncertain reward CSs from the certain 0% reward CS (p 
< 0.005), (2) highly significant ROC area for distinguishing pooled data from uncertain reward 
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CSs from the certain 100% reward CS (p < 0.005); (3) both ROC areas have the same ‘sign’ (i.e. 
both > 0.5 indicating activation by uncertainty or < 0.5 indicating inhibition by uncertainty). A 
neuron’s uncertainty coding latency was defined as the first millisecond after which it met these 
criteria for at least 24 consecutive milliseconds. See Supplementary Figure 3.1 for the latencies 
and full ROC timecourses in all neurons with detected latencies. This method was chosen to 
produce latencies that resemble those seen in raw traces of neural activity, but the same key 
result (i.e. Pal having shorter latency than ACC and icbDS) was found with other latency 
detection methods (e.g. different smoothing methods, significance criteria, required number of 
consecutive time bins,etc). Each area’s latency was defined as the 1st percentile of its distribution 
of single neuron latencies, and areas were compared by testing whether the difference between 
their latencies was significantly different from that expected by chance (p < 0.05, permutation 
test, conducted by comparing the latency difference calculated on the true data to the distribution 
of latency differences calculated on 20000 permuted datasets that shuffled the assignment of 
neurons between the two areas being compared). 
Rough vs graded uncertainty coding. In standard uncertainty tasks, a neuron’s rough 
uncertainty activity was calculated as the difference in normalized activity between pooled data 
from all uncertain reward CSs and pooled data from the certain 0% and 100% reward CSs. Its 
graded uncertainty activity was calculated as the difference in normalized activity between data 
from the uncertain 50% reward CS and pooled data from the uncertain 25% and 75% reward 
CSs. Neurons were classified as having significant graded uncertainty coding if their graded 
uncertainty activity was significantly different from 0 (p < 0.05, rank-sum test). Areas were 
classified as having graded uncertainty coding if the number of neurons with significant graded 
coding was significantly different from chance levels (p < 0.05, binomial test). 
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Quantification of information seeking behavior during inactivations. Response times 
(RTs) were computed online and used to determine when the CS was replaced by the cue, 
defined as the time between the ‘go’ signal (i.e. the trial start cue’s disappearance) and the gaze 
entering the response window around the CS. To improve the accuracy of RT measurements for 
our offline analysis, RTs were recomputed offline using response windows that were corrected 
for session-to-session variability in eye tracker settings using the procedure described above (i.e. 
centering the window on the observed peak gaze location separately for each CS location and 
each session). We then analyzed the RTs from all correctly performed trials in which the animal 
made a response and there was at least rough agreement between the online and offline RTs (i.e. 
within 0.2 s of each other). These criteria were met by nearly all correctly performed trials 
(n=17968/18035; 99.6%). We then quantified the information seeking bias using an Infobias 
Index based on the mean RTs for the Info and Noinfo CSs: 
Infobias Index = (Noinfo RT – Info RT) / (Noinfo RT + Info RT) 
The Infobias Index was computed separately for each session, and separately for each of 
the 2 x 2 combinations of time in session (pre- vs post-injection) and CS location relative to 
injection site (contralateral vs ipsilateral). We then derived two additional measures. For session 
and each CS location, we defined the change in Infobias index as the difference between post-
injection and pre-injection Infobias indexes. We defined the change in Infobias laterality as the 
difference between the changes in Infobias Index for the contralateral and ipsilateral sides. 
To test whether icbDS and Pal inactivations affected information seeking behavior 
(Figure 3.7C), we computed the mean change in Infobias index and tested whether it was 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.05, permutation test conducted by comparing the true 
mean change in Infobias Index to the distribution of mean changes in Infobias Index computed 
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on 20000 permuted datasets in which pre- and post-injection data were shuffled with each other). 
For pooled data from all inactivation sessions and for control sessions (Figure 3.7C) we used the 
same procedure, except to be conservative we included an additional correction for the different 
numbers of sessions of each type that were collected from each animal, by using weighted means 
such that each animal’s data was weighted by the number of inactivation sessions that animal 
contributed to the dataset. The same key results were obtained in uncorrected data (significant 
change in contralateral Infobias Index during inactivation sessions, p = 0.0015; no significant 
change in Control sessions, p = 0.8786; inactivation sessions significantly different from control 
sessions, p = 0.0243). 
To test how inactivations interfered with information seeking behavior, we analyzed RTs 
separately for Info and Noinfo CSs. RTs were normalized by z-scoring all RTs separately for 
each session and CS location. The mean normalized RT was then calculated for each 
combination of session, time in session (pre- or post-injection), and CS type (Info or Noinfo CS). 
Then for each session and CS type we calculated the change in mean normalized RT (post-
injection – pre-injection). Finally, we tested whether the RT changes for each CS type were 
different from 0 (signed-rank test on per-session normalized RT changes), and whether the RT 
changes for the two CS types were different from each other (signed-rank test on per-session 
difference between normalized RT changes for the two CS types). 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Anatomically-connected regions of ACC, icbDS, and Pal contain ramping neurons 
that signal reward uncertainty 
To identify neural networks that are selectively responsive to reward uncertainty, we 
presented monkeys with fractal visual conditioned stimuli (CSs) predicting the delivery of a 
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future juice reward with 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% probabilities8,19 while recording across 
areas of ACC, icbDS, and Pal (Figure 3.1). All three areas contained numerous neurons that were 
strongly activated or inhibited by all the CSs that cued uncertain rewards (Figure 3.2A; Figure 
3.2B, cyan, blue, turquoise; 25%, 50%, and 75% reward CSs). These responses were primarily 
excitatory in ACC and icbDS and often inhibitory in Pal (Figure 3.2A).  The average responses 
consisted of sustained ramping to the moment when the uncertain outcome would occur (Figure 
3.2A,B). Importantly, unlike conventional reward-related neurons in these areas15,16, these 
neurons were more responsive to reward uncertainty than reward value; their responses were 
substantially lower for the CSs that cued certain outcomes, even though they had the highest and 
lowest values in the task (black, 100%, certain reward; gray, 0%, certain no-reward; Figure 
3.2A-C). Furthermore, many of these neurons responded to uncertainty in a graded manner8: they 
responded most in the condition with maximal uncertainty (50% reward), less in conditions with 
intermediate uncertainty (75% and 25% reward), and least in conditions with no uncertainty 
(100% and 0% reward).15 Specifically, neurons with a significantly greater average response to 
the 50% CS than to the 75 and 25% CSs were found in all three areas (Figure 3.2D, dark blue; p 
< 0.05, signed-rank test), with much greater prevalence than expected by chance (p < 0.001 in 
each area, binomial tests), and were significantly more prevalent than the opposite response 









Figure 3.1: (A) MRIs were taken immediately after recording uncertainty coding neurons with 
the electrode still in place. Shown are coronal views in which the electrode track is visible as a 
black ‘shadow’ on the MRI; the yellow arrow indicates the location of the electrode tip. Top: 
recording site in ACC, at a location symmetrical to the ACC in the opposite hemisphere. Middle: 
recording site in icbDS, at a location intermediate between the body of the caudate and putamen. 
Bottom: recording site in Pal, with the tip adjacent to the ventral boundary of the anterior 
commissure. Abbreviations: cc, corpus callosum; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Cd, 
caudate; Pu, putamen; ac, anterior commissure; Nb, nucleus basalis. (B) Reconstruction of 
recording sites in ACC (top), icbDS (middle), and Pal (bottom). Circles indicate locations of 
neurons that responded to uncertainty with significant excitation (black) or inhibition (white). 
Structures are shown in the coronal plane. Neurons are projected onto the nearest shown plane; 
text indicates the range of neuron locations.  
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The network refined its uncertainty signals over time. Uncertainty signals emerged 
markedly earlier in Pal (Figure 3.2A, arrows; Supplementary Figures 3.1,3.2; significantly 
shorter latency in Pal than ACC and icbDS, both p < 0.001, permutation tests) but this initial 
signal did not yet encode the graded level of uncertainty (i.e. similar activity for 25, 50, and 
75%; Supplementary Figure 3.2). Uncertainty signals later emerged in both ACC and icbDS at 
roughly similar latencies (Figure 3.2A; Supplementary Figure 3.1; no significant latency 
difference, p = 0.11), and those two areas first significantly encoded the graded level of 
uncertainty, doing so before Pal (50 > 25,75%, Figure 3.2A; Supplementary Figure 3.2). These 
results indicate that a rapid but rough Pal uncertainty signal is followed by a slower, graded 
signal in cortico-striatal areas. Further, these results match the precise anatomical tracers 
performed by our collaborators in the Dr. Suzanne Haber Laboratory outlined in detail in the full 















Figure 3.2: (A) Example responses to the uncertainty task from neurons in ACC (top), icbDS 
(middle), and Pal (bottom). The ACC and icbDS neurons have excitatory ramping activity up to 
the time of uncertain reward: strongest for highly uncertain rewards (blue, 50%), strong for 
moderately uncertain rewards (turquoise colors, 25% and 75%), and weak or absent for certain 
outcomes (black, 100%; gray, 0%). The Pal neuron has similar ramping activity with an 
opposite, inhibitory direction of response. Top of panel: times of each spike (dots) on each trial 
(rows). Bottom of panel: smoothed firing rate for each CS. (B) The population average 
normalized activity of uncertainty coding neurons in each area ramps up to the time of the 
uncertain outcome. Shaded areas are ± 1 SE. Arrow, dashed line, and text indicate each area’s 
latency of uncertainty coding. Gray area below x-axis is the pre-outcome analysis time window. 
(C) Population average pre-outcome normalized activity is well fitted with a second-order 
polynomial function of reward probability (gray lines; shaded areas are ± 1 bootstrap SE) 
indicating an inverted-U relationship between reward probability and neural responses, as 
expected for uncertainty coding. (D) Graded coding of reward uncertainty. Histograms show 
each neuron’s difference in normalized activity between CSs with high (50%) vs. moderate 
(25,75%) reward uncertainty. Arrows indicate the mean. Colored neurons have significantly 
differential activity. In all areas, more neurons are significantly more active for high uncertainty 
(blue) than moderate uncertainty (turquoise). *** indicates more neurons than expected by 





3.3.2 Many uncertainty-selective neurons across this network anticipate uncertainty 
resolution through the delivery of advance information 
Our findings thus far identify an interconnected cortico-BG network that signals reward 
uncertainty with ramping anticipatory activity. This raises a few key questions: what event is the 
network anticipating? Most crucially, does the network anticipate the moment of receiving an 
uncertain outcome per se, or the moment of receiving information to resolve the uncertainty? 
To answer these questions, we designed a task to separate the time of receiving 
information from the time of receiving the outcome (information viewing task, Figure 3.3A). On 
each trial the monkey was shown a fractal CS that indicated that a reward would be delivered in 
3 seconds with 100%, 50%, or 0% probability. There were two types of CSs. Informative CSs 
(Info CSs) were followed after 1 second by an informative visual cue whose color indicated the 
upcoming outcome (e.g. orange → reward, gray → no reward). Non-informative CSs (Noinfo 
CSs) were followed by a non-informative cue whose color was randomized on each trial and 
hence did not indicate the upcoming outcome. Importantly, there was no way for animals to use 
the information to control or influence the outcome. Thus, neurons that simply anticipate 
uncertain rewards should respond differently during the Info and Noinfo 50% reward CSs, 
because only the Noinfo 50% outcome is uncertain at the time of delivery (Figure 3.3C). 
However, neurons that anticipate information should activate specifically in advance of the time 
when the animal expects to be informed of the outcome, which occurs at different times on Info 
and Noinfo trials: on Info trials information is delivered after 1 second by the informative cue 
(Figure 3.3C, red arrow), while on Noinfo trials the animal is first informed of the outcome after 
3 seconds by receiving the outcome (juice delivery or omission) at the end of the trial (Figure 




Figure 3.3: (A) Information viewing task. On Info CS trials, CSs predict 100, 50, or 0% reward, 
and are followed by an informative cue that indicates the outcome with certainty. On Noinfo CS 
trials, analogous CSs are followed by one of two non-informative cues that are randomized and 
hence leave the outcome uncertain until it is delivered at the end of the trial. (B) Left: Mean 
fraction of trials of each type in which a lick was detected in the 500 ms before cue onset. Data 
are from n=18 sessions in which licking was measured and there was reliable differential licking 
that distinguished 100% reward from 0% reward trials. Licks occurred before the cue on ~5% or 
fewer trials, indicating that animals had little or no expectation that juice would be delivered at 
the time of the cue. Notably, the Info 50% reward CS evoked intense gaze and neural activity in 
anticipation of the informative cue (Fig 3), but evoked near-zero licking, indicating that the 
information-related behavior and neural activity cannot be accounted for by expectation of juice 
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reward. If anything, there was slightly but significantly less licking for the Info 50% reward CS 
than for the other Info CSs. There were significant but small differences in licking between some 
other conditions as well (Noinfo 50% vs 0%, p = 0.005; Info 50% vs 0%, p = 0.001; Info 50% vs 
100%, p = 0.032). Right: Same as left, for the 500 ms before outcome delivery. Licks occurred 
on a large fraction of trials, indicating that animals expected juice to be delivered at the time of 
the outcome. Licking was generally consistent with the mean reward in each condition. On 
Noinfo trials licking significantly increased with reward probability (100% > 50%, p = 0.003; 
50% > 0%, p = 0.044; signed-rank tests). On Info trials licking was significantly greater after 
reward was cued than after no-reward was cued, both for trials in which reward was initially 
uncertain (50%→reward > 50%→no reward, p = 0.001) and trials when reward was initially 
certain (100% > 0%, p < 0.001). (C) Left: if neurons ramp to the receipt of information, they 
should also ramp to informative cues on Info trials (red). Right: if neural uncertainty signals 
simply anticipate uncertain juice delivery, they should only ramp up to uncertain outcomes on 



















Indeed, the cortico-BG network contained a substantial population of neurons that 
anticipated the receipt of information to resolve reward uncertainty. We quantified each neuron’s 
uncertainty signal using the ROC area for using its firing rate to distinguish trials with uncertain 
rewards vs certain rewards (50% vs 100% and 0%). We then calculated an “Info Cue 
Anticipation Index” defined as its uncertainty signal during the last 0.5 sec of the Info CSs (just 
before an informative cue) minus its uncertainty signal during the same time window for the 
Noinfo CSs (just before a non-informative cue). Neurons with significant Info Cue Anticipation 
Indexes were highly prevalent in all three areas of the network (Figure 3.4D,E; 47%, 54%, and 
50% of recorded neurons in ACC, icbDS, and Pal (n=9/19, 13/24, and 21/42, respectively); more 
than expected by chance, all p < 0.05, binomial tests).  
Importantly, as expected for an information-anticipatory signal, the same neurons that 
anticipated informative cues on Info trials also commonly anticipated uncertain outcomes on 
Noinfo trials, and did so in similar manners. For example, the icbDS neuron in Figure 3.4A was 
strongly activated on uncertain reward trials in advance of both informative cues (top, red) and 
uninformed outcomes (bottom, blue), while the Pal neuron in Figure 3.4B was inhibited in 
advance of these task events. To quantify this, we defined an analogous “Uncertain Outcome 
Anticipation Index” as the change in a neuron’s uncertainty signal from the beginning to the end 
of the cue period on Noinfo trials. This index was significant in a substantial number of single 
neurons in all three areas (21%, 63%, and 31% of neurons in ACC, icbDS, and Pal; more 
neurons than expected by chance in all areas, binomial tests, all p < 0.05) and was most prevalent 
in icbDS (higher fraction of significant neurons in icbDS than ACC or Pal, both p < 0.05, 
binomial tests). There was a strong correlation between the two neural anticipation indexes (rank 
correlation = 0.45, p < 0.001, Figure 3.4E). That is, many neurons, especially in ACC and icbDS, 
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were activated in anticipation of receiving information from both cues and outcomes, while other 
neurons, especially in Pal, were inhibited for both. Thus, when examining neurons whose 
uncertainty signals on Noinfo trials significantly anticipated the outcome, the average timecourse 
of their uncertainty signals on Info trials bore a strong resemblance to a hypothetical 
information-anticipatory signal (Figure 3.3C, Figure 3.4F; similar results for all three areas, 
























Figure 3.4: (A) An example icbDS neuron had strong ramping activity anticipating the time of 
receiving information about uncertain rewards: the informative cue on Info trials (top, red) and 
outcome delivery on Noinfo trials (bottom, blue). This activity was greatly reduced or absent 
when the outcome was certain (black, gray). (B) An example Pal neuron had a similar response 
pattern but with ramping inhibition instead of excitation. (C) Differential uncertainty signals 
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emerge in anticipation of informative cues. Each row is a neuron, and the color at each time 
point indicates the difference between its uncertainty signals on Info vs Noinfo trials. Color 
indicates sign of coding (red: more positive uncertainty signal for Info; blue: more negative 
uncertainty signal for Info; color bar indicates scale). (D) Information-anticipatory activity was 
significantly present in approximately half of uncertainty-related neurons in each area. *** 
indicates significantly more neurons than expected by chance, p < 0.001. (E) Correlated 
anticipation of the two reward-informative task events. Many neurons have significant 
Informative Cue Anticipation Indexes (red, y-axis), Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Indexes 
(blue, x-axis), or both (purple). The two indexes are highly correlated; text indicates rank 
correlation and its p-value. ACC, icbDS, and Pal neurons are indicated by triangles, squares, and 
circles. Black line is a linear fit with type 2 regression. (F) The population average uncertainty 
signal from neurons with ramping uncertainty signals on Noinfo trials (blue) closely resembles 
Hypothesis 2: they also have strong ramping activity on Info trials that anticipates the time of 
viewing the informative cue (red). Error bars are ± 1 SE. Gray areas are the time windows for 


































3.3.3 Monkeys preferentially direct their gaze towards objects associated with uncertainty  
Given the cortico-BG network’s strong information-predictive signal, we next asked 
whether information predictions evoke information seeking behavior in monkeys. Since 
monkeys, like humans, scan uncertain environments for information with their eyes15,26,171, we 
hypothesized that monkeys may anticipate information by directing their gaze to objects in their 
environment associated with the uncertainty to be resolved. Consistent with previous work, we 
found that monkeys licked in anticipation of juice rewards (Figure 3.3B) and that their gaze was 
attracted to visual objects based on their expected reward value (Figure 3.5A, 100% CS > 0% CS 
(black > gray), informative reward cue > no-reward cue (dark red > light red)). 
Strikingly, however, monkeys’ gaze was even more strongly attracted to objects based on 
their uncertainty, especially in the moments before receiving information to resolve that 
uncertainty. On Info trials, monkeys could anticipate receiving information during the Info 50% 
reward CS as they awaited the upcoming informative cue (Figure 3.5A, red arrow). Monkeys 
were substantially more likely to gaze at the Info 50% reward CS than all other CSs (signed-rank 
tests, all p < 0.001). Importantly, this attraction of gaze was specifically related to upcoming 
information rather than to reward value or uncertainty per se. Monkeys gazed at the Info 50% 
reward CS more than at the Noinfo 50% reward CS, which was associated with exactly the same 
reward value and uncertainty but was not followed by information (Figure 3.5B), and more than 
at the 100% reward CSs, which were associated with double the reward value but had no 
uncertainty to resolve (Figure 3.5A,B). Furthermore, this intense gaze at the Info 50% reward CS 
occurred despite near-zero licking, indicating that animals were anticipating the delivery of 




Figure 3.5: (A) Monkey’s gaze on Noinfo trials is attracted to objects in anticipation of outcome 
delivery Lines indicate the probability at each millisecond that the animal gazes at the stimulus. 
Shaded areas indicate ± 1 SE (most too small to see). On uncertain 50% reward trials monkeys 
gazed less at the CS than on 100% reward trials, but while viewing the non-informative cues 
their gaze ramped up in anticipation of the outcome until it became greater on uncertain 50% 
than on 100% reward trials. (B) Monkeys’ gaze on Info trials is attracted to CSs in anticipation 
of receiving informative cues about uncertain rewards. Same format as (A). Monkeys gazed 
more at the 100% CS (black) than the 0% CS (gray), but gazed most of all at the uncertain 50% 
CS (red) which could be followed by informative cues indicating either reward (dark red) or no 
reward (pink). *, **, *** indicates p < 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. Monkeys’ gaze at reward cues then 
ramped up to the time of reward delivery, while gaze at no-reward cues was minimal. (C) 
Uncertainty-related gaze behavior in each animal significantly anticipated informative cues (y-
axis) and uncertain outcomes (x-axis). Same format as Fig 3.4E, but analyzing gaze instead of 









Similarly, on Noinfo trials, monkeys could anticipate receiving information at the end of 
the cue period as they awaited the upcoming reward delivery or omission (Figure 3.5B, blue 
arrow). Again, at that time the monkeys gazed at the cue more during Noinfo 50% reward trials 
than all other conditions (all p < 0.001), even 100% reward trials that had double the reward 
value (Figure 3.5A,B). They did so even though the upcoming information about the outcome 
was delivered through a non-visual modality (receipt of juice or no juice), and even though 
100%, 50%, and 0% Noinfo trials all used exactly the same set of visual cue stimuli; they gazed 
at those cues most avidly on Noinfo 50% reward trials when they were associated with an 
uncertain reward, and did so specifically in the moments before the uncertainty was going to be 
resolved. These monkeys also behaved consistently in standard uncertainty-related tasks that 
lacked informative cues (essentially treating all trials as Noinfo because no cues were available). 
Thus, when we analyzed monkeys’ gaze behavior in the same way that we analyzed neural 
spiking activity, we found that all monkeys had significantly positive Info Cue Anticipation and 
Uncertain Outcome Anticipation indexes, indicative of information-anticipatory behavior (Figure 
3.5C, all p < 0.001, signed-rank test). Next, we compared neuronal activity preceding 
information delivery when the monkeys’ gaze was on the stimulus compared to when the gaze 
was off of the stimulus. We found that neural information signals were present even at moments 
when the monkeys’ gaze was away from the stimuli, but were significantly enhanced during 
matched time points from other trials when the monkeys’ gaze was off the stimulus. This was 
true in both the information and standard uncertainty tasks (Figure 3.6). 
This data suggested that the cortico-BG network’s information signals could be well 
suited to motivate the animal’s information-oriented behavior – a hypothesis we next tested 




Figure 3.6: Mean normalized activity before receipt of information is enhanced when gaze is on 
the stimulus (dark dots/lines) compared to when gaze is off the stimulus (light dots/lines), 
especially for intermediate reward probabilities when reward is uncertain. Error bars are ± 1 SE; 































3.3.4 Pharmacologically inactivating areas of BG that contain uncertainty-selective neurons 
causally decreases information-seeking behaviors 
Given these findings, we hypothesized that information-predictive neurons in the basal 
ganglia have a causal role in motivating gaze shifts to gain information. If so, then temporarily 
inactivating the basal ganglia subregions that contain these neurons should impair the motivation 
to seek information. We therefore trained monkeys to perform a task in which gaze shifts were 
required to gain information (information seeking task, Figure 3.7A). Monkeys fixated a spot of 
light and then continued to fixate during a delay period while a 50% reward CS was presented on 
either the left or right side of the screen. After the fixation point disappeared (‘go’ signal) the 
monkey was free to gaze in any manner they chose. On trials with an Info CS, gazing at the CS 
caused it to be immediately replaced by an informative cue indicating the trial’s outcome (reward 
or no reward). On trials with a Noinfo CS, gazing at the CS caused it to be replaced by a non-
informative cue. Importantly, the monkeys’ gaze at the CS allowed them to gain information 
about the outcome but did not allow them to influence the outcome itself in any way (i.e. the 
outcome always occurred a fixed time after the ‘go’ signal regardless of whether and how they 
gazed at the CS). In addition, we used a fixed-duration delay period between CS onset and the go 
signal to allow animals to anticipate the moment when information would become available. 
Indeed, animals had strongly anticipatory behavior, at times shifting their gaze onto the CS at 
short latencies before they could have perceived and reacted to the ‘go’ signal (Figure 3.7B, 
response times (RTs) < 50 ms). Monkeys were highly motivated to seek information, shown by 
their much faster RTs to shift their gaze onto Info CSs than Noinfo CSs (Figure 3.7B). We 
quantified the response bias favoring the info CSs with an “Infobias Index” (Figure 3.7B) which 
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Figure 3.7: (A) Information seeking task. Monkeys were shown a CS, waited for a ‘go’ signal, 
and then were allowed to gaze at it. Gazing at an Info or Noinfo CS caused it to be replaced with 
an appropriate informative or non-informative cue. Regardless of whether or when animals 
gazed at the CS, the outcome was delivered a fixed time after CS onset. (B) RT distribution for 
animal B. The animal had much faster RTs for Info trials (red, mean = 144 ms) than Noinfo trials 
(blue, mean = 239 ms). The animal often anticipated the time that information would become 
available, as indicated by the prevalence of anticipatory saccades especially on Info trials (e.g. 
RTs < 50 ms). This histogram includes all data that was collected when inactivations were not 
being performed. It shows n=1962/1966 (99.8%) of those RTs; not visible are four outliers from 
Noinfo trials (RT = 0.741, 0.748, 1.326, 1.335 s). Text indicates the equation for the Infobias 
Index. (C) Muscimol inactivation effect on RTs to contralateral CSs, quantified as the change in 
Infobias Index (after– before). There are significant reductions in Infobias Index for icbDS 
inactivations (green), Pal inactivations (blue), and all inactivations (black), but not control 
sessions (gray). *, **, *** indicate p < 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. Error bars are ± 1 SE. (D) Cumulative 
distributions showing each session’s inactivation effect on the Infobias Index for contralateral 










Consistent with the lateralized functions of basal ganglia circuitry196,197, we predicted that 
unilateral inactivations would reduce information seeking behavior directed toward objects in 
contralateral space. Indeed, unilateral injections of muscimol, a GABAA agonist, into either 
icbDS or Pal in the vicinity where information-anticipatory neurons were recorded caused the 
information seeking response bias to be significantly reduced in contralateral space (Figure 
3.7C,D; icbDS, n=9 sessions, p = 0.028; Pal, n=8 sessions, p = 0.031; all inactivations, n=17, p = 
0.001; permutation tests; see Supplementary Figures 3.3 for injection sites and effects in each 
session). No significant change was observed in a control dataset consisting of sham and saline 
injections (Figure 3.7C, gray, n=26 sessions, p = 0.93). In addition, inactivations had no 
significant effect on information seeking for ipsilateral CSs (all p > 0.4, Supplementary Figure 
3.5). Thus, relative to control sessions, inactivations caused the information seeking bias to 
become lateralized – significantly shifted away from the contralateral side (p = 0.019, 
Supplementary Figure 3.5). 
We further investigated the mechanism by which icbDS and Pal activity promote 
information seeking. Our data suggest that icbDS and Pal have reciprocal inhibitory connections 
and tend to encode information predictions in opposite manners, with icbDS neurons activated 
and Pal neurons commonly inhibited (Figures 3.2,3.3). We therefore hypothesized that icbDS 
and Pal activity have opposite influences on motivated gaze behavior, such that information-
oriented gaze shifts are motivated by icbDS activity and suppressed by Pal activity. The icbDS is 
primarily active during the Info CS, so inactivation should slow gaze shifts to the Info CS while 
leaving responses to the Noinfo CS relatively intact. Conversely, Pal is normally inhibited during 
the Info CS, so inactivation should leave responses to the Info CS relatively intact while 
speeding gaze shifts to the Noinfo CS. Both of these predictions were borne out in the data. 
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Inactivation of icbDS slowed gaze shifts to the Info CS but did not significantly change RTs to 
the Noinfo CS (Supplementary Figure 3.6B, left, Info CS p = 0.0003, Noinfo CS p = 0.64, rank-
sum tests; significantly different changes for Info vs Noinfo, p = 0.0081, permutation tests). 
Conversely, inactivation of Pal speeded gaze shifts to the Noinfo CS but did not significantly 
change RTs to the Info CS (Supplementary Figure 3.6B, center, Info CS p = 0.17, Noinfo CS p = 
0.001; significantly different changes for Info vs Noinfo, p = 0.0046). Thus, icbDS activity 
motivated gaze shifts to gain information, while Pal activity suppressed motivation to gaze at 
objects that would not yield information. 
Importantly, these inactivation effects on information seeking were not caused by 
generalized effects on overall motivation to perform the task, which could potentially be affected 
by inactivation of striatum and pallidum circuitry involved in primary reward seeking 
behavior.198–202 Specifically, icbDS inactivations slowed RTs to the Info CS without reducing 
measures of general motivation, while Pal inactivations speeded RTs to the Noinfo CS without 
increasing measures of general motivation (Supplementary Figure 3.7). If anything, Pal 
inactivations speeded RTs to the Noinfo CS in spite of a modest reduction in general motivation 
to perform the task (Supplementary Figure 3.7), consistent with similar reductions of motivation 
from previous Pal inactivations.198–201  
3.4 Discussion 
Our work demonstrates the existence of a neural network responsible for motivating 
actions to resolve uncertain situations by seeking knowledge about future rewards. Previous 
studies identified cortical and basal ganglia networks that make conventional predictions about 
when future rewards are available and motivate behavior to seek those rewards.2,184,196,203 Indeed, 
our monkeys had strong tendencies to gaze at visual stimuli based on their reward value. 
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However, the novel ACC-icbDS-Pal neurons we report here have relatively little response to 
reward value, and hence their primary function is not likely to be control of such reward value-
oriented behavior. Instead, they have a quite distinct function: they predict when information will 
become available to resolve reward uncertainty and motivate gaze behavior to obtain that 
information. This information seeking gaze behavior can be even more potent than the attraction 
of gaze to primary reward: our monkeys gazed much more avidly at the CS that provided 
informative cues than at any other stimulus, even CSs and cues that were associated with double 
its expected reward value. Our data show that this information seeking gaze behavior is very 
similar to activity observed in the cortico-BG network. 
Our data is crucial evidence for theories of reward learning, overt attention, and 
economic  decision making, which propose that objects and events in the world are assigned 
salience both by neural systems that track primary reward value and its uncertainty170,179,204,205, 
and by a system that anticipates information to resolve uncertainty.26,29,206–208 Furthermore, our 
data demonstrates a neural mechanism through which information seeking can compete and 
interact with primary reward to drive ongoing behavior.28,171,209,210  
In fact, information seeking goes hand-in-hand with primary reward seeking in natural 
environments. Most experimental studies of reward seeking begin with the presentation of a cue 
stimulus (or an environmental context) that tells the subject what reward to predict and what 
actions are needed to obtain it. However, rewards in natural environments can be scarce and 
uncertain, and fully predictive reward cues rarely come for free or materialize from thin air. In 
these situations, organisms must first seek and obtain information about the rewards that are 
available in their environment; only then can they predict the value of those rewards and use that 
value to motivate reward seeking behavior. In this sense, the cortico-BG network for information 
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seeking may be critical to ensure that organisms seek out the reward-related cues in their 
environment that are necessary for the proper operation of the well-known networks that predict 
and seek primary rewards.2,184,196,203,210 Indeed, information-related neurons in all three areas 
were intermixed with other neurons that encoded the reward value of stimuli and 
outcomes2,184,196,203,210, indicating that information- and reward-related neurons are well-
positioned to support each other’s computations. 
While information-anticipatory signals were present in all three areas of the cortico-BG 
network, each area also had distinct features suitable for unique contributions to information 
seeking. Notably, fluctuations in ACC information signals were the earliest predictor of future 
behavior. ACC information signals changed several hundred milliseconds before gaze shifts, 
while BG signals changed more proximally to behavior. This finding supports and extends 
theories that ACC is especially important for motivating behavioral shifts to explore available 
prospects and learn their reward value and other properties211–213, tracking their level of 
uncertainty and how it evolves over time as beliefs are updated in response to surprising 
outcomes4,212,214–218, and using this information to decide how to control future cognition and 
behavior.212,219 In particular, while it is well acknowledged that the ACC needs to receive a broad 
array of reward- and uncertainty-related information to perform these functions209,219, our data 
indicates that the ACC is not merely a passive recipient of this information; rather, the ACC is 
tightly linked to the emergence of motivational drive to actively seek out that information from 
the environment.  
In addition, our findings indicate that information seeking behavior is motivated by a BG 
circuit mechanism that is analogous but distinct from the BG circuits that motivate conventional 
reward-seeking behavior. There are two key parallels. First, behavior-related fluctuations in BG 
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information signals follow fluctuations in cortex and are proximal to behavioral gaze shifts. This 
is consistent with classic theories of cortico-BG circuits90 and work on cortex-striatum 
interactions220–222 suggesting that cognitive and motivational signals can be computed in cortex 
and then sent to BG where they are processed and used to guide behavior. Second, the specific 
functions of each BG subregion in information seeking are consistent with classical BG circuit 
motifs: notably, icbDS and Pal neurons commonly encode information signals with opposite 
signs and these areas have opposite causal influences on behavior, such that icbDS activity 
speeds gaze shifts to gain information while Pal activity slows gaze shifts that will not provide 
information. This resembles analogous findings for BG areas involved in primary reward 
seeking: antagonizing D1 receptors in visuomotor dorsal striatum slows gaze shifts to gain large 
juice rewards87, while inactivation of Pal speeds gaze shifts to gain small juice rewards.199  
Importantly, however, the BG mechanisms underlying physical reward- and information-
oriented behavior are at least partially distinct at the neuronal and behavioral levels: (1) when 
animals avidly gazed at the Info CS in anticipation of viewing the informative cue, they had 
near-zero licking behavior, indicating that they were not anticipating juice reward; (2) the 
cortical and BG neurons we identified that are linked to information-anticipatory behavior 
primarily anticipated the moment of gaining information, not the moment of gaining juice 
reward; and (3) inactivation effects on information seeking could not be explained as a result of 
generalized effects on juice reward seeking. Thus, this cortico-BG network appears to be 
specially focused on online information seeking behavior. This is in contrast to other BG circuits 
and interconnected areas involved in reward prediction errors and reinforcement, which 
commonly encode information and primary reward in a common currency.26,28 In addition, 
whereas classical theories of cortico-BG circuits that classify Pal as an output structure90,223, our 
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data extends previous results201 by showing that Pal in fact responds earliest to uncertainty-
related events. This is consistent with theories that BG rapidly selects salient stimuli to guide 
future behavior.224,225 Our data supports a scenario in which (A) Pal first signals a rapid, rough 
assessment of reward uncertainty; (B) ACC and icbDS first signal the precise graded level of 
uncertainty; and (C) the resulting representation of uncertainty ramps up to the time of its 
resolution by information, and drives ongoing information seeking behavior. 
Given the link between the ACC-icbDS-Pal network and information seeking behavior, 
variations in the network’s activity could be responsible for the natural variations in information 
seeking behavior that are commonly found across individuals185,210,216 and tasks.226,227 In the 
same vein, it is notable that ACC and BG are implicated as sites of dysfunction and targets for 
treatment in human disorders of motivated behavior (such as obsessive-compulsive 
disorder228,229, Parkinson’s disease230, and drug addiction58) that are known to affect reward- and 
uncertainty-related behavior.231–236 Our results raise the possibility that these disorders and 
treatments may also affect the motivation to seek information about future events. While this has 
been little studied, there is evidence that Parkinson’s disease reduces the motivation to gather 
information needed for upcoming decisions237 and impairs learning from early access to 
information about uncertain outcomes238 Taken together, our work provides a foundation for 
understanding the neural network mechanisms by which information is detected, predicted, and 
used to motivate behavior. 







Supplementary Figure 3.1: (A) Cumulative distribution of latencies for all single neurons 
recorded during standard uncertainty tasks that had detected latencies of uncertainty coding. 
Circles, dashed vertical lines, and text indicate the estimated population latency of uncertainty 
coding in each area (error bars are ± 1 bootstrap SE). Uncertainty signals emerge first in Pal, 
followed by ACC and icbDS at similar latencies. (B) Heat map of uncertainty coding over time 
for the neurons in (A). Top: ACC; middle: icbDS; bottom: Pal. Each row is a neuron. Black dots 
indicate the detected latency of uncertainty coding. Color indicates the neuron’s uncertainty 
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coding at each time during the task (red = more active for uncertain than certain CSs, blue = less 
active for uncertain than certain CSs, white = no uncertainty coding). Uncertainty coding for is 
quantified based on the ROC area for using the neuron’s activity to discriminate between 
uncertain vs certain CSs. For this latency analysis we conservatively calculate the uncertainty 
coding at each time point as the least extreme of two ROC areas: one for discriminating all 
uncertain CSs from the 100% reward CS, and the other for discriminating all uncertain CSs from 
the 0% reward CS. Uncertainty coding is predominantly excitatory in ACC, almost exclusively 








































Supplementary Figure 3.2: In order to directly compare rough and graded uncertainty-related 
activity, they are both quantified here in terms of normalized activity. (A) Population average 
rough uncertainty signal for each area, defined as the difference in mean normalized activity 
between uncertain CSs (25%,50%, and 75%) and certain CSs (0% and 100%). The shaded area is 
± 1 SE. Asterisks indicate significant differences from 0 (signed-rank test, p < 0.05). Consistent 
with the latency analysis in Fig S1, the rough uncertainty signal reaches significance first in Pal 
and later in ACC and icbDS. (B) Population average graded uncertainty signal in each area, 
defined as the difference in mean normalized activity between the maximally uncertain CS 
(50%) and the moderately uncertain CSs (25% and 75%). There is a trend for a graded 
uncertainty coding at all time points in all areas, but it grows and reaches significance first in 
ACC and icbDS, and later in Pal. Thus, while rough uncertainty coding emerges first in Pal, 




Supplementary Figure 3.3: (A) Reconstructed 3D coordinates of each neuron in the dataset, 
shown for all areas (indicated by colors) and all animals (indicated by symbols; see legend). 
Coordinates are relative to the midline, superior tip of the anterior commissure (AC). Top shows 
coordinates in the horizontal plane. Bottom shows coordinates in the coronal plane. The three 
areas where uncertainty-responsive neurons were found were clearly anatomically distinct from 
each other, and were located in similar, overlapping locations in all animals. (B) Same as (A) 
with an overlay showing the reconstructed coordinates of the injection sites. Colors indicate area 
(icbDS or Pal) and substance (muscimol or saline; see legend). The injection sites for icbDS and 
Pal were clearly distinct from each other and overlapped the locations of uncertainty-responsive 
neurons in their respective areas. The injection sites for saline overlapped with the injection sites 





Supplementary Figure 3.4: Same as Fig 3.2G,H, plotted separately for each area. (A,C,E) Same 
as Fig 2H for each area. The average uncertainty signal of neurons that had a significant ramping 
uncertainty activity measured only using Noinfo trials (i.e. cells with a significant Uncertain 
Outcome Anticipation Index, p < 0.05, permutation test). Note that these neurons are selected 
solely based on their activity anticipating the outcome on Noinfo trials. Even so, in all areas 
these populations show a strong uncertainty signal in the same direction anticipating the cue on 
Info trials. Thus, these neural populations had information-anticipatory activity resembling the 
theoretical pattern in Fig 2G. (B,D,F) Same as Fig 2G for each area. Best-fit lines from type 2 
regression are plotted for all areas with significant correlations (p < 0.05); arrows are plotted for 
all areas with significant mean indexes different from 0 (p < 0.05). All areas show coding 
indexes consistent with information-anticipatory activity, though in different manners due to the 
different signs of neural coding in icbDS vs ACC and Pal. icbDS shows an especially strong 
pattern of information-anticipatory activity. icbDS neurons only encode uncertainty with a 
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positive sign, and nearly all neurons are in the upper right quadrant, indicating positive 
anticipation of both informative cues and uncertain outcomes (mean Info Cue Anticipation Index 
= +0.27, mean Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index = +0.24; both significantly greater than 0, 
signed-rank tests, both p < 0.0001). These two indexes are generally consistent across neurons 
with relatively low variability so there is no significant correlation between them (rho = -0.27, p 
= 0.195). By contrast, ACC and Pal populations included subsets of neurons with different signs 
and variable strengths of uncertainty coding in standard uncertainty tasks (Fig S1). As a result, 
information-anticipatory activity should not necessarily lead to non-zero population average 
indexes, but should result in the two indexes being correlated, indicating that individual neurons 
anticipate both informative cues and uncertain outcomes in similar manners. Indeed, in both 
areas there is a strong and significant correlation such that cells with a more positive Info Cue 
Anticipation Index also have a more positive Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index (ACC: p = 
0.018; Pal: p = 0.015) – the same pattern seen in Fig 2I for the population of all uncertainty-


















Supplementary Figure 3.5: (A) Mean Infobias Index in each animal. All animals had 
significantly positive Infobias Indexes in the mean over all sessions shown here and in all 
individual sessions (n=43/43; all p < 0.05, permutation tests). (B) No apparent change in Infobias 
Indexes for ipsilateral CSs. Same format as Fig 4C, but for ipsilateral CSs. There is no 
significant change resulting from inactivations and no significant difference between 
inactivations and control. (C) Inactivations change the laterality of information seeking behavior 
relative to control sessions. Inset: cumulative distributions of change in infobias laterality for 
inactivations (black) and controls (gray). Change in infobias laterality was quantified as: (change 
in Infobias Index for contralateral CSs) – (change in Infobias Index for ipsilateral CSs). Bar plot: 
difference in the change in infobias laterality between inactivations and controls. Error bars are ± 
bootstrap SE. The change in infobias laterality was more negative for inactivations than controls 
(p = 0.019, permutation test), indicating that information seeking behavior was shifted away 













Supplementary Figure 3.6: (A) Predictions: the two BG areas should influence information 
seeking in distinct manners, such that icbDS inactivation slows RTs to obtain information (left, 
Info CS, red), Pal inactivation speeds RTs that will not obtain information (middle, Noinfo CS, 
blue), and controls have no effect (right). (B) Inactivation results, quantified by comparing 
normalized RTs (Methods) for the Info CS (red) and Noinfo CS (blue) before vs. after 
inactivation. icbDS inactivation slowed RTs to the Info CS without any significant effect on 
Noinfo RTs (left); Pal inactivation speeded RTs to Noinfo CS without any significant effect on 
Info RTs (middle); control sessions had no significant effect on RTs to either CS (right). Error 










Supplementary Figure 3.7: Inactivation effects on general motivation and reward responsiveness. 
We quantified the animal’s motivation to perform the task using two conventional measures of 
general motivation: the response time to initiate a trial by fixating on the fixation point on 
correctly performed trials and the probability of making an error during the trial (C). To 
summarize these measures and gain statistical power to detect any potential small effect of 
inactivation on motivation, we created a composite Motivation Index (A,B) pooling these 
measures by z-scoring each measure within each animal, averaging the two measures within each 
session, and then flipping its sign (so that positive Motivation Index indicates higher motivation 















Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 Neuroscientists, psychologists, and economists alike have long reported that humans and 
nonhuman animals often prefer to resolve uncertainty about the future at the earliest possible 
timepoint. This preference is strong enough that humans and nonhuman primates are willing to 
sacrifice an amount of upcoming reward in order to obtain information about uncertain 
outcomes, even if this information does nothing to change the value or timing of the outcome. 
These findings suggest that the information about uncertain outcomes itself has motivational 
value. In this thesis, we drew inspiration from the large body of research which identifies and 
describes how the brain monitors, predicts, and motivates behaviors toward pursuing primary 
rewards. Prior studies detailed diverse cortico-BG networks which contribute to these reward-
seeking behaviors. Despite the importance of reward-related information to survival, there 
remain expansive gaps in there literature as to how the brain motivates behaviors towards 
uncertainty resolution through information seeking.  
 Here we presented two studies which expand our understanding of signals within the 
primate brain that underlie reward uncertainty processing and may play a direct role in 
motivating information-seeking behaviors: 
 In the first study we identified a population of neurons within specific, internal capsule-
bordering regions of the dorsal striatum which selectively respond to objects  associated with 
uncertain outcomes. We found that the response of these neurons was selective only to uncertain 
rewarding outcomes and not punishing ones and that it discriminated between objects which 
predicted different levels of reward uncertainty. We reported that this activity was largely object-
presence-dependent and could be reduced by removing the object prior to outcome delivery and 
that it evolved rapidly as animals learned the value of new object-outcome associations.  
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 Working with our collaborators in the Dr. Suzanne Haber Laboratory, we were able 
determine the locations of projection sites from ACC to icbDS, as well as between areas of 
icbDS and pallidum. The regions that project or receive inputs from icbDS contained uncertainty 
and information anticipation signals similar to icbDS.  
 In the second study we interrogated the response of single neurons across an identified 
neural network which spans areas of cortex and BG and found that this activity motivates 
information-seeking behaviors that resolve uncertain outcomes. First, we confirmed the existence 
of neurons whose activity was modulated by reward uncertainty in areas of ACC, icbDS, and 
pallidum. We then demonstrated that a significant portion of neurons in each of these three areas 
‘shifted’ their uncertainty-anticipatory signal to task epochs where uncertainty was resolved by 
the delivery of advance information, rather than by the task outcome itself. Moreover, we found 
that each brain area had distinct characteristics in its information-anticipatory signal and that the 
sign of each signal is congruent with observed anatomy between these structures. We 
demonstrated that during uncertainty monkeys preferentially direct their gaze at objects 
associated with gaining information to resolve uncertainty, looking more frequently at these 
objects in the time preceding uncertainty resolution. This behavior is much like the observed 
changes in uncertainty-related activity in the ACC, icbDS, and pallidum neurons. Finally, we 
demonstrated that monkeys shift their gaze faster  towards objects which give information about 
uncertain outcomes and that differences between reaction times to informed and non-informed 
objects can be altered by disrupting the activity of BG members of this network. By inactivating 
areas of either the DS or pallidum, we were able to decrease information-seeking bias by 
differentially influencing reaction time towards informative and non-informative secondary cues. 
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Following inactivations in DS, subjects were slower to shift their gaze towards informative cues 
where inactivations in pallidum resulted in faster gaze shifts towards non-informative cues.  
 In natural environments reward-seeking and information-seeking behaviors are often 
performed in conjunction with one another; animals must first seek out information about 
primary rewards within their environment and then act to pursue those rewards. The level of 
uncertainty in a situation is a crucial variable for determining when information is necessary and 
when it can be learned from objects within an environment. Our research sheds light on the 
mechanisms by which similar brain areas- and even similar network structure motifs- that 
motivate behaviors towards pursuing primary rewards also motivate behavior towards seeking 
information to resolve uncertainty about those rewards.  
 Within the BG, for example, previous studies identified contrasting roles of the dorsal 
striatum and pallidum in guiding behavior towards primary rewards of different sizes. When DS 
activity was disrupted, animals’ gazes were slower to shift towards objects which gave large 
rewards.87 Conversely, inactivations within pallidum produced faster reaction times to objects 
which gave small rewards.199 Here, we reported corresponding effects, but which are specific to 
information-seeking preferences rather than reward size.  
Our findings also provide insight into the internal circuitry of the BG more broadly. The 
striatum is typically considered an input nucleus of the BG and the pallidum an output nucleus, 
suggesting that a signal within the BG would emerge first within the striatum and then later in 
pallidum. Instead, we report that generalized uncertainty signals emerge first in pallidum and 
later in icbDS and ACC. These findings support more recent theories that implicate the BG in 
rapid responses to objects in an environment that can influence future interactions with these 
objects.231,232 Indeed, we observed that uncertainty responses in pallidum were very fast to 
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emerge, but that these responses lacked information on specific levels of uncertainty predicted by 
an object. In contrast, later signals in ACC and icbDS contained a refined signal of uncertainty, 
which significantly discriminating between objects and differentiated between levels of 
uncertainty. This supports popular concepts of ACC, which suggest its importance in foraging 
and exploration, combining cognitive and motivational variables.4,154,155 These integrated signals 
could then be projected  to the BG to guide behaviors through known pathways.46–49   
  Clinically, there are large gaps in our understanding of both how emotion and cognition 
are impacted by uncertain states and how the brain alters behaviors during information-seeking 
to reduce these states. As a result, mental states associated with mis-evaluation or intolerance of 
uncertainty in a patient’s life, such as generalized anxiety disorder238,239, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder239–241, and impulsive risk-taking242–244, remain inadequately treated. Indeed, studies 
suggested that disease states such as these could, at least in part, be driven by pathology in the 
striatum and related cortico-BG pathways. Furthermore, diseases which disrupt normal function 
of the striatum have noted consequences on a patient’s ability to accurately gauge levels of 
uncertainty and risk in their daily lives.245,246 Bettering our understanding of how the brain 
responds to uncertain states and how these states might drive behaviors towards seeking 
information to reduce this uncertainty could help to develop more precise interventions for these 
ailments. 
 Ultimately, this work identifies novel mechanisms by which the brain anticipates 
uncertainty and motivates behavior towards seeking information to resolve it. It demonstrates 
that information-driven behaviors can be reduced by disrupting these mechanisms.  Our findings 
add to the field’s understanding of interactions within basal ganglia and across cortico-basal 
ganglia network motifs and offers insight into how the brain might use analogous cortico-basal 
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ganglia networks to motivate the concurrent information-seeking and reward-seeking behaviors 
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